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ART. I. — OBSERVATIONS AND HINTS ON EDUCATION.

EDUCATION is the great problem of the age. The education of the people is held to be the first condition of the stability of free social institutions; the only efficient means of social progress. Especially is the necessity of popular education in democratic communities insisted on. So imperative is this necessity considered, that the want of education is even sometimes held as a sufficient cause of social, political, and personal disfranchisement. To this principle our most democratic of all democracies presents a sublime example of devotion; retaining one sixth of its whole population in hereditary, perpetual slavery, for the want of this indispensable, to them impossible, prerequisite for freedom: so that a man here is not always a man, "endowed by his Creator with certain natural, essential, and inalienable rights." Obviously, then, it is a fundamental maxim, that democratic institutions, as they are the result of, can be made permanent only where a certain degree of intelligence exists in the whole mass of the people. This was once thought to be the especial mission, the peculiar glory of republican governments; the necessity of knowledge widely diffused, for their own preservation. It was also supposed to be an

equal and inevitable necessity of arbitrary governments, that their subjects should be kept in profound ignorance; not merely of the rights, relations, and destiny of man and society; but ignorance of letters and of all knowledge, not required for the fit discharge of their servile duties and occupations. Ignorance was regarded as both the mother of devotion, and the best security for the unresisting acquiescence of the masses in the domination of the privileged few. Ignorance and slavery were held to be correlative and synonymous.

But this century witnesses the phenomenon of absolute governments laboring for the education of their subjects, with a zeal and earnestness not yet felt in this community of nations, which professes to rely specially for its continuance upon the popular intelligence. The king of Prussia seems to have exploded completely the old doctrine of the necessary connexion between ignorance and servitude. He has made education the handmaid of despotism. Under his auspices, it prevents, instead of promoting social progress; instead of being the herald of freedom, it is the prime minister of an authority, which allows hardly a figment of political liberty. The House of Hapsburg is repeating the experiment without fear; even in its subjugated Italian dominions, in the scenes and amid the slumbering but unextinguished memories of old Roman freedom, kindling the lamp of knowledge, in order to impress more deeply and surely the sternest maxims of royalty. Even Nicholas is said to be introducing normal schools into his dominions. The experiments, which his brethren of Austria and Prussia have so successfully carried out, have demonstrated to him, that the A, B, C, by itself, has no spell of intrinsic power to break the chain on the shoulder of the serf. Liberty, it thus appears, is not a necessary concomitant or consequence of any extant system of education; since Prussia, with liberal and enlarged provisions for the instruction of the whole people, remains in the passive apathy of despotism, and is as

stern an opposer of every movement towards popular freedom, under the rule of the third Frederic, as she was under that of the first or the second. Do we not find this seeming paradox corroborated by some recent developments of our American experiment? Within a few years, such things as mobs, usurping the functions of law, trampling upon natural rights guaranteed by constitutions, have been events of not unfrequent occurrence. It has been boasted by the parties and vindicators of these anarchical tribunals, that they were honorably distinguished from European, monarchical mobs, that they were not assemblies of the vulgar and ignorant; but that they were composed of gentlemen, respectable men, men of refinement and education; and they have even been placed in honor side by side with the men of the Boston revolutionary tea-party.\* If we were not called upon to reverence them as patriots, a sort of qualified admiration seems to have been expected for them as respectable incendiaries, gentlemanly ruffians, educated assassins, the "*Di minores gentium*." The schoolmaster, then, may be abroad over the whole land, and the people may be, according to the common forms of expression, an educated people, without communicating, or acquiring the first elements of liberty, or catching a glimpse of the true destiny of man and society.

Nevertheless, without paradox, the schoolmaster must be abroad, or the notion of liberty is a dream and delusion. Neither self-regulated freedom, nor even liberty under law, can exist without him. None but an educated can be a permanently free people. The question is not of the importance of education; but what is education? that which is the support and safeguard of personal and political freedom? And who is the schoolmaster? I am not about to answer these questions. The subject is too wide and profound to be treated in a brief periodical essay. I shall only

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\* See Att. Gen. Austin's speech at Faneuil Hall.



put down some desultory thoughts, not claiming them as the most important, or as suggesting a reply to the questions. If I should deal more in negatives than affirmatives, declare what is not education, who is not the schoolmaster, rather than state a system, and describe qualifications; it will readily occur to every one, that it is easier to innovate than to reform, to destroy than to build up. The dullest engineer, with cannon and match, can batter down stone and mortar; but it requires a genius of quite another sort to build a Parthenon, or a St. Peter's. Perhaps, even that, which to the common sight is deformity, may be a grace in the eye of the true seer; what to me seems discord, to the ear of the authentic hearer may be notes of the universal harmony.

It may be true, that every degree of knowledge, however small, does to its extent exercise a beneficial influence upon society; that, other things being equal, even one, who has only learned to read and write, is more likely to be a peaceable citizen, regardful of the laws and of public order, than one who is entirely ignorant of letters. The records of public prisons and penitentiaries have been thought to go far towards proving this position. But reasoning from such premises is extremely doubtful. There is no obvious, or easily traced connexion between the A, B, C, and moral conduct; and it is possible in any case to ascertain but a small part of the influences, which have made any individual a subject of the penal justice of society. It is, therefore, unwise and dangerous to draw general inferences from particular habits or deficiencies, between which and the offences for which punishment is inflicted no very direct relation is perceived. Invariable coincidence would hardly be sufficient to establish the relation of cause and effect in such cases; even if a much higher standard of education were supposed than is implied in the popular systems. But the coincidence is not universal. Two remarkable exceptions are before me. In the Cold-bath Field's Prison, near London, there were, in 1834,

967 prisoners. The chaplain of the prison ascertained and reported to the Middlesex magistrates, that 104 of these were uneducated, of whom 48 had been imprisoned before; while 863 were educated, 217 of whom were undergoing a second imprisonment. Neither the amount nor the mode of education is stated.

The second exception is presented in the return of 326 prisoners in the Glasgow Bridewell, from June 1834 to June 1835. Of these only 52 could neither read nor write, 143 could read only, and 131 could read and write. These are exceptions to the general current of reported observation on this subject. It is confidently inferred from numerous criminal statistics, that much the largest portion of criminals are uneducated; and that the proportion constantly decreases according to the degree of education. But admitting this proposition in its largest extent, some important particulars are to be considered, before any authentic practical inference can be drawn from it. The greater part of criminal statistics is furnished by those countries where the horizontal division of society exists; that is, where the community is composed of two classes, between which there is no social sympathy, and few common interests; the one, and the least numerous, hereditary proprietors of the land, tracing through endless genealogies, titles, which they deem almost divine, and possessing nearly a monopoly of the political power. The other, and vastly most numerous class, is regarded as an inferior order of being, born for servitude, to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. A division of society, in short, where *man* is unknown and unrecognised; but where man is degraded, on one side of the line into a king or a lord with hereditary honors, traced through robbers, courtezans, and "scoundrels ever since the flood;" and on the other into a peasant, villein, serf, vassal, or whatever other name of contumely may be used to cover up and smother Humanity. This class is poor and oppressed, and poverty and oppression beget resistance, and occasion acts which the laws call crime. If we examine,

for example, the condition of the masses in Ireland, or in England, there will be no necessity for inquiring into the comparative degrees of ignorance and knowledge, to account for the number of legal offences. The true lesson to be learned from these phenomena is reverence, trust; reverence for man, trust in his instincts; admiration that in a social condition, which presents scarcely anything but temptations, nay, where the first law of nature, self-preservation, operates as almost a necessity for violence and plunder; man is yet so steadfast to his higher nature, so much observant of the universal law of order. The wonder is not that he is so often a criminal; but that he is not much oftener and a much greater criminal.

Another circumstance is to be noted in this connexion. By far the greater part of the offences, which fill the records of criminal justice, are offences against property. The general right of property is not one of the clearest of the natural rights, any farther, certainly, than it is a personal acquisition, gained by one's own labor. As a subject of transmission and inheritance, the natural right is somewhat questionable. Some writers, who cannot be suspected of a disposition to rob man of any portion of his original garniture of rights, maintain that property is altogether a conventional arrangement, to which no one has a right absolutely independent. However this may be, it is certain that offences against property are not the grossest violations of natural justice, and very rarely indicate the deepest moral depravity. Compared with injuries to some other natural rights, it seems to be true, practically as well as poetically, that "who steals my purse steals trash."

Whatever may be the foundation of the *right* of property, the conventional *laws* of property in most European countries, and to a less extent in our own, are in the highest degree artificial, arbitrary, and absurd. In those countries the object of the laws is to perpetuate the horizontal division; and as a necessary consequence, a large proportion of crime consists



of violations of these arbitrary enactments, of laws for the preservation of game, oppressive revenue and excise laws, police regulations, and the like. Offences against such laws, or against any merely arbitrary law, do nowhere denote a very deep depravation of the universal moral instincts of man. Analyzed, they amount to little more, even if we give the law the best condition, that of being the act of the majority, than a disregard of the public opinion, of which the statute is the exponent. In a society horizontally divided, in which the mass below the line are oppressed, poor, and ignorant, and their poverty and ignorance are the consequences of their social condition, established and maintained by law; violations of such laws are, as nearly as possible, mere venial trespasses, if indeed they are not obedience to higher laws of nature. Obedience to one universal and invincible law they certainly denote, — *the law of hunger*.

The offences of the poor and ignorant class are public, notorious, observed, and recorded in their beginnings. Consider, on the other hand, the crimes of the higher educated class; the cheateries of trade, the quackeries of professions, the frivolity and heartlessness of fashionable life, the contempt for the masses, the immeasurable sacrifices and miseries of war, the oppressions and frauds of legislation, the slavery and ignorance of the people, the private and social luxury, licentiousness, and debauchery: — not crimes against the statute, or if so, hard to define, hard to detect, difficult to prove; not all open to the world's gaze; not filling the calendars of penal justice; but crimes against the laws of nature, written in the intuitions of the universal reason; visible only in their effects upon the manners and moral sentiment of the community; visible not until the pollutions they engender have broken out upon the surface of society in ulcers and putrefying sores. This picture must be placed by the side of that; the vices of the higher classes contrasted with those of the ignorant lower, and the temptations and tendencies of their respective

conditions compared ; before any invariable and unquestionable rule of relation can be established between knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice. Nay, is it not the consummation of all crime, that the educated, who have the control of social institutions, should place one human being in a position, where ignorance is almost a necessity ? “ ’T is not because of his toils that I lament for the poor. We must all toil, or steal, (however we name our stealing,) which is worse. No faithful workman finds his task a pastime. The poor is hungry and athirst, but for him also there is food and drink ; he is heavy-laden and weary, but for him also the heavens send sleep, and of the deepest. In his smoky cribs, a clear dewy heaven of rest environs him, and fitful glitterings of cloud-skirted dreams. But what I do mourn over is that the lamp of his soul should go out ; that no ray of heavenly, or even earthly knowledge, should visit him, but only in the haggard darkness, like two spectres, fear and indignation. Alas, while his body stands so broad and brawny, must his soul lie blinded, dwarfish, stupefied, almost annihilated. Was this, too, a birth of God ; bestowed of heaven, but on earth never to be unfolded ? That there should one man die ignorant, who had capacity for knowledge, this I call a tragedy, were it to happen twenty times in a minute.” \*

A convict in one of the state prisons, so says one of those very witty gentlemen, who enlighten and reform their age through the periodical press, traced his downfall to the original sin of subscribing for a newspaper, and neglecting to pay for it. This pleasant piece of editorial humor is quite as rational an account of the matter, as that which refers differences of character and conduct to the letters of the alphabet. The learning of those cabalistic signs, so full of mystery and perplexity to the child, is made the basis of education, as commonly understood and conducted ; and education is reckoned completed by the attain-

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\* Carlyle.



ment of the power to read and write, the use, dextrous or otherwise, of the mechanical rules of numbers, a smattering of geography, and some few other elements. But the letters of the alphabet are not knowledge, but only symbols of sounds. Their only use is to enable men to receive the thoughts of others, and communicate their own, in the absence of oral intercourse. Reading and writing are not ends, but means; "means, by which ignorance may converse with wisdom." The A, B, C are the first things learned, after the faculty of speech has been completely acquired. For the highest ends of education, might they not be postponed to a much later period of life? Might they not be more beneficially reserved for some of the higher parts of the superstructure, or even for the ornaments and capitals?

Induction is the foundation of all practical knowledge, and the habit of observation, which it requires, is, like all other habits, most easily acquired in early life. If not formed then, it cannot be in after life, but by constant watchfulness and painful discipline; the process of self-culture, meanwhile, is at a stand, or but tardily progressive. Argue as we may concerning different systems of instruction, no system is of much value, which does not aim at making education a self-discipline, at making every man, in truth, a self-taught man. The chief value of books is to assist, not to supersede, the process of self-culture. Great is the theory of self-taught men, and full of wisdom. Little are they indebted to Faust's wondrous art; they derived their knowledge from that universal revelation of knowledge in man and nature, of which books only copy and often misquote the language. And have they not been, in all ages, the mighty of the earth, the seers and prophets of mankind? "Not out of those, on whom systems of education have exhausted their culture, comes the helpful giant to destroy the old, or build the new; but out of unhand-selled savage nature, out of terrible Druids and Berserkirs, come at last Alfred and Shakspeare."

The child, the infant, is constantly making observations; the whole of his studious play is a process of induction. Instead of fostering this habit, do not the practised systems of education tend directly to prevent its formation, to crush the awakening energies of the intellect, to connect learning with the most disagreeable and painful associations? At the time when the young spirit is full of the opening flush of life, gushing over with uncontrollable activity, impatient of restraints, impatient of rest, as long as its bodily organs hold out, ravished with the mysterious beauties and glories of the new universe, into which it has just emerged, longing to go out and inquire of everything concerning its whence and why; instead of following out these indications of nature, these clear revelations of instinct, systems of education take him wholly away from nature and her inspiring loveliness and grandeur, and confine him for nearly half of his waking existence between six dull walls, to hard and wearisome wooden seats, chaining his free limbs; where he is not permitted without rebuke even to glance out into the bright world, which half-revealed invites him forth through the windows of his prison; there compelled for six interminable hours, each moment a pang, to fix his eyes and pore over mysterious, uncouth figures, which contain no revelation for him, of whose present, or ultimate use he in vain labors to form a conception; and all this under the guard and watch of a stranger, whom men call pedagogue (child driver), schoolmaster, who works for wages in odd seasons, when he cannot get them in any other occupation, and who "knows thus much of the human soul, that it has a faculty called memory, and can be acted on through the muscular integuments by application of birch rods." Give the child a set of pot-hooks and the range of the kitchen at home, and in most cases he will work out for himself more elements of knowledge in a day, than he can, with grief and indignation, compass in half the term of his scholastic inflictions. And that no accompaniment of discomfort may be wanting, — the school-

house, in the dusty highway, every pleasant association carefully excluded from its precincts; in many cases a thing which a family, retaining a decent self-respect, would feel it shame to occupy! Are not all the substance and environments of systematic education calculated to quench instead of keeping alive the excited curiosity, the thirst for knowledge? Is it strange that education comes so miserably short of its high pretensions?

Why do we not here, as elsewhere, found our systems upon induction? Why, instead of counteracting, do we not follow and assist the instinctive developments of the young mind? That is ever active, ever seeking knowledge by observation. From the moment the child begins to crawl, he lays hold of everything, feels, tastes everything, and from everything gets knowledge, is teaching himself, learning the nature and properties of substance, acquiring ideas of extension, solidity, and the other mysteries of matter. He pulls his miniature go-cart to pieces, and his nurse, in her ignorance, bewails his precocious propensities for destruction. Miscall not that mischief, though it cost you money. He is trying to solve high problems in philosophy, inquiring what his go-cart was made of, how it was put together, comparing it with other forms and cohesions; nay, if you knew it, he is learning the rudiments of a mechanical trade. In his nursery he is constantly laying up materials for many high processes of thought; not indeed unaided by books. Books are now his delight, because they present to him several new problems in mechanics and natural philosophy, and also enable him to demonstrate his own force in pulling them to pieces. It may be announced as a general, if not a universal, proposition, that he learns more from books at this time, than in any subsequent equal period of his life. He masters their material riches. Is it not an evil, more or less, that any untoward associations should ever make them aught to him but large depositories of intellectual treasures?



When he throws off his leading-strings, having acquired the power of walking erect, he continues with new activity his unwearying process of observation, comparison, generalization. The nursery, the house, are all too narrow for his swelling curiosity. He rejoices, with the instinct of his own freedom, to go forth into the free air, to mingle his glad voice with the music of the birds, to float with the clouds, to ride upon the wings of the wind, to revel among the flowers, to listen to the thousand melodies, audible or inaudible to the senses, which rise and swell around him, harmoniously mingled, from the air, the earth, and the waters. Call him not idle. He is not idle. No one is ever idle, until the unnatural restraints of unnatural systems of education have destroyed the freshness, and broken up the delightful and harmonious associations of his first intercourse with nature. He is now the pupil of nature, in her wide schoolhouse of diverse and ever changeful beauty. Did we but know it, and how to use it, he is now, if he shall never be again, the ardent and successful student, daily adding knowledge to knowledge, and laying up rich materials of wisdom. The flower he plucks, and as we name it, *idly* throws away, is a text book, from which he learns lessons, that "the whining schoolboy, creeping like a snail unwillingly to school," will probably forget, but will not be likely to learn. He studies the first written book, of which all printed books are only translations, more or less tolerably, some execrably done, but none conveying the full spirit, truth, and beauty of the original.

Let him stay in this school yet a little longer. Follow, assist the direction of nature, but do not thwart her. Give him a teacher, if you will, to help him to observe, and aid him in his interpreting. Indeed some such interpreter, or seeing teacher, not a pedagogue, would seem to be necessary. But do not quench his spirit in its spring time by immuring him between walls (of brick or wood and mortar), and compel him to turn from the living, God-written page, to the dark,

dead, perplexing hieroglyphics, (nay double hieroglyphics ; for are not most words, to the child as to many men, as much hieroglyphic mysteries, as the literal symbols which compose them?) from which as yet he can only and reluctantly draw small rills of nourishment for his infinite curiosity. Let him acquire many of the first truths of nature, the elements of which books are made ; let him have some conception of the proper use of letters and words, of the functions of books, and a strong yearning to enter the wide domains of thought of which books are the portals ; in short let him learn to be an authentic and judging reader, before he learns to read ; lest he bow his mind to authority, and fail to be a man, — “ man thinking.” Said he not truth, who wrote, “ I had better never read a book, than to be warped by its instruction clean out of my own orbit, and made a satellite instead of a system ? ”

The only use of letters being to make us acquainted with books, in pursuance of the spirit of the first step, the substance of education is laid in books, so far as education is a system. If the first steps do not create an unconquerable distaste or disgust, the child learns to consider books as almost the only sources of knowledge. Hence a reverence is acquired for books, merely as books, paralyzing to the energies of the intellect, and not to be removed in after life, but with serious, painful, and long continued discipline. Hence the whole process of education is mere instruction, authoritative teaching, dogmatical. It does not draw out the powers of one's own mind ; the true purpose of education, as its etymology indicates. The memory is almost the only mental faculty called into active exercise, while the higher powers of induction, comparison, reasoning, abstraction are almost inert, or but partially developed, never attaining their full maturity, except in rarely fortunate circumstances, or in minds of superior native energy. “ The intelligent soul is not roused to free and vigorous activity.” Hence there is so little of self-reliance, so much of servile

dependence on the thoughts of others, the reverence for the past, the slow and contentious progress of improvement, the acquiescence in authority, the seeing and hearing with the organs of others, the using of other men's heads instead of our own.

This dogmatical character pervades the whole course of instruction. The child believes what is told him on the authority of the teacher, the master, or the book, without being taught to inquire into the validity of the authority; whether the professed revelation made to him is authentic, a fact or a fable. The mind is nearly passive during the process. If the teacher or the book be authentic, it is better so to learn, than to be ignorant. But he is not able to judge whether they be or not. A true book, true teaching, as I have said, are but transcripts of the facts of nature, more or less legibly written, according to the clearness of the vision of the seer. Of the greater part of those facts every person may acquire a competent knowledge, by the proper use of those instruments, which are furnished to all; namely his five or six physical senses, and his intuitions. Books and teachers do not originate, create, but only declare; and nothing which is not, for the most part, accessible without their aid. For were not all the things contained in books known, or to be known, before they were recorded in books? Were they not in the universe, not hidden but only invisible, until the eye of some seer was opened upon them? Every eye, that chooses, may be a seer. To make all eyes such is the mission of education.

This dogmatical teaching conveys no knowledge, nothing beyond belief. Of all the things that may be poured into the mind, the truth of little is known until it is verified by the use of one's own faculties. The child is taught (for a modicum of astronomy is included in the prevalent systems of education; if only so much as is supposed to be a necessary preliminary for the study of geography) that the earth is round, that it revolves round the sun, and certain



problems concerning the stars. How knows he this? He believes it because Copernicus, Galileo, and certain other astronomers are reported to have ascertained it. Nay not on information so authentic as this; but for the most part on the authority of teachers without eyes, as well as himself. Why may not he hold these magnificent truths with the certainty of sight, instead of dreamy assent? Why not be himself a Copernicus? What hinders that he should trace the paths of the planets in their plain, though invisible orbits; that he should correct for himself the first error of his senses, and demonstrate by his own faculties, that the sun and the gorgeous heavens are not satellites of this our earth, performing around it their daily revolutions? He has all the instruments that Pythagoras had, who first gave the true solution of the celestial phenomena. He has all that Copernicus had, who in modern times rediscovered it. He needs no telescope, except that curious miraculous pair of telescopes, which the Creator has placed in his forehead. The old Greek, and the modern Prussian stargazers had no other. The successor of Copernicus, the Father of modern astronomy, was no better provided. Kepler's instrument for celestial observation was nothing more than a wooden right-angled triangle, with sides of 6, 8, and 10 feet, suspended by the right angle, from which a line and plummet was hung. In one of the sides about the right angle, were stuck several small quills, through which he observed the stars. This was Kepler's telescope, the rude instrument with which he discovered and demonstrated the laws of the planetary motions. "Three pieces of wood set in a triangle," says a German writer, "were the magic instruments, wherewith Kepler drew from the muse Urania secrets unknown to all antiquity, and on which the whole of modern astronomy rests." Cannot our scholar make a Kepler telescope? Let every one be, according to the intellect that is given him, a Kepler. Let the first lesson inculcated be to see with his own eyes, to reason with his own judgment.

Let him discover all that he can discover, and demonstrate all that is by him demonstrable. Are not the objects to be examined all around him, and within him, accessible to the lowest intellect as to the highest? Is not the book of nature written in the universal language, vernacular to all men, intelligible to all, who will learn to read it? That language let him read first of all; and if, with his best endeavors, he cannot unravel all the puzzles of the earth and sky, it will be time enough to go to commentators, his text books and teachers, and learn as much as he is able to understand.

Having touched upon astronomy for the purpose of illustrating my thought, I may mention an error of instruction of some importance, inculcated in the elementary books of the schools, and also in the higher literature, for children of a larger growth. From the contemplation of the grandeur and vastness of the celestial phenomena, devout men are accustomed to inculcate the sentiment of the extreme littleness of man. Even from exhibitions of great power in the natural elements, or from the sublime and majestic scenes of the earth, as boundless prospects from high mountains, wild Alpine solitudes, stupendous precipices, foaming cataracts, the moral still is man's insignificance. Insignificant certainly, contrasting himself with the Creator of these wonders. Considering man in this relation, such sentiments are a just expression of devotion. Man is in no danger of exalting too high his conceptions of God. Infinitely below his perfections are the highest conceptions of the loftiest cherub. But there is an exaggerated and unbecoming humility in thus belittling man before mere material forms, abstracted from their origin and author, be they the sublimest or most terrible. They are the creations of the Almighty; but is not man above them all, a more mysterious and glorious creation? Is not he, the true man, he whom we may justly call a man, God-like and immortal? Has he not a capacity to comprehend, be it imperfectly, these wonders; to

question the stars, and be answered, concerning their author and their laws ; to look beyond the visible concave of the heavens, and see system upon system of worlds, about centre upon centre of systems, revolving their endless circles about the universal centre of immensity ? Is not this vast capacity a proof that he is greater than they ? Why should his spirit bow itself, or stand in awe before them ? They are symbols of the Infinite, "the time-vesture of the Eternal, the time-woven garments by which God is seen." And so is everything. Not a blade of grass but is full of the mystery of the Divinity. The sun and stars, the precipice and the cataract, are no more.

Men have stood under Niagara, and professed, with a true heart, or an ostentatious humbleness, to feel an utter prostration, an overwhelming sense of the littleness of man. Fools, or weak ! Why there more than in the verdant landscape, in the field or the forest ? What is Niagara, but a mass of unconscious matter, impelled by the law to which it is subjected, tumbling some one hundred and sixty feet down a precipice, as it needs must, and can no otherwise do ? By the judicious application of certain mechanical contrivances, you can compel it to turn grindstones, or spinning jennies, or serve other economical purposes of this money-making world. Nay, as a sartorial artist once said, or is said to have said, in a fine glow of professional enthusiasm, "Is it not a capital place to sponge a coat ?" Nay farther, is it inconceivable that the silent attrition of its own waters (indeed it is believed to have receded several miles from its primeval locality), or even the labors of man, moved by some great impulse to undertake a stupendous experiment, may reduce its channel to a long and gradual slope, or a succession of low cascades ? Where then is Niagara, with its appalling roar, and terrible magnificence ?

If some seers have reported their impressions truly, the sentiment of littleness in these cases is a violation of man's instincts. Looking down from the top of a



very high precipice, nothing but empty space before it, some men have said that they felt an almost irresistible inclination to leap off into the void.\* Immensity is there almost visible. Is not the feeling described the outswelling of the soul's instinct of the infinite? Man's mind is in a condition unfavorable to its full, perfect, and harmonious development, when he feels himself insignificant and belittles himself before mere magnitude, space, or time; when he transfers to the material symbols, in any measure, the homage they were intended to claim for the infinite, which they shadow forth. Material magnitudes, be they ever so vast, are all changeable, perishable, subject in some degree to the control of man. He can dissolve their masses, break up their combinations, reorganize them in new forms. He knows that "the great globe itself shall fade away." Is it thus with man? Is not he immortal? Has he not a soul, which, though the minutest particle of matter may destroy its outward visible symbol (the body), myriads of Niagaras, the avalanche of a universe of matter, cannot annihilate, cannot touch?

And what to him are time and space? Is he not greater than either, than both? Does he not, in a sense, fill all space; a greater portion than all matter? Is he not with all the stars; rolls there an orb in the remotest region of space, of which he cannot form a conception; and is his conception not a real spiritual presence? Nay, beyond all material creation, if to it there be a beyond, does not his thought reach, and discern there the universal Presence? And time; is he not spiritually in all time; is not the past and future present with him? Before time was, is he not there, when the spirit of God first moved upon the face of the watery chaos? Is he not with Adam in his innocence, and in his transgression? Is he not in every successive period of time, in every epoch of history? Is he not at the final consummation of earth's affairs, when

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\* I believe Walter Scott felt and describes this sensation, as he stood upon one of the high banks of the Orkneys or Shetland. I have seen it alluded to by others.

the elements shall melt with fervent heat; beyond the end of time, is he not present amid the solemn realities, the compensations and retributions of eternity? And they, the loved departed, whom day and night we see, and, not in dreams, commune with, in the scenes we loved together, and in other spheres; is it but a vision, and not a reality, spiritual, the only realities in the universe? "Is the past annihilated, or only past? Is the future now existent, or only future? Those mystic faculties of thine, memory and hope, already answer; already through those mystic avenues, thou, the earth-blinded, summonest both the past and the future, and communest with them, though as yet darkly, and with mute beckonings. The curtains of yesterday roll down; the curtains of to-morrow roll up; but yesterday and to-morrow both *are*. Pierce through the time-element, glance into the eternal. Believe what thou findest written in the sanctuaries of man's soul, even as all thinkers, in all ages, have devoutly read it there; that time and space are not God, but curtains of God; that with God as it is an universal *Here*, so it is an everlasting *Now*."

Man's body, and his bodily actions, his garments, his "time-vesture," are all that belong to earth. Man himself is not a child of time and space. For he has conceptions of the infinite, fainter or more vivid, but for ever approximating to it; and the universe is in his mind. Is not this mysterious power, this multipresence of his spirit, a testimony that he is Godlike? Let him stand in awe before the mystery of his own soul; but refuse, not in pride, but with true reverence, to bow before aught save the Incomprehensible One, who alone is infinite, who is infinity. Man's thought should be that of Kepler, "Father of the world! what moved thee thus to exalt a poor, weak creature of earth so high, that he stands in light a far-ruling king, almost a God, for he thinks thy thoughts after thee?"

Education should be practical, it is said; its proper function is to train up youth into practical men; and

practical men are the only useful men in society. In one sense, unquestionably true; in another sense, unquestionably false. All scripture is given by inspiration. All knowledge is essentially practical, calculated to enable man to accomplish the purpose of man's being; and all knowledge is worthless, which is not made to polarize around the central law of his being. In this sense the proposition is unimpeachable, that education should be practical. But what is meant by *practicalness*; who is the practical man? Is it he who judges of what may be done, from what has been done, and deems every theory a chimera, every project impossible, for which he does not remember a precedent; who refers everything to the maxims and usages of the past? Such a man may be very skilful in the traditionary routine of his particular occupation, industrious and devoted to it; may be conversant with established forms of ordinary business; know the marketable value of most kinds of property, and be willing to accept such innovations upon old customs, as it has been demonstrated will yield a tangible per cent. But the idea of social progress is not in his conceptions. Is this the end of practical education? Is it not a vast waste of the resources of society, to expend its thought and treasure in devising and maintaining elaborate systems, for accomplishing only this? An end, too, that would come as certainly, in the natural course of things, without the costly apparatus, that is wasted upon it?

On the contrary, can any system of education be truly practical, which has not reference to man in his whole capacity, obligations, and destiny, as something more than a money-getting animal; which does not aim to draw out into free activity the whole faculties of his mind? And is not he the only practical man, who has formed himself under such a system of culture; who has taken in the widest range of investigation and discovered most of the laws of nature and of the human mind; who has attained the clearest insight into the relations of things, and established his



principles of judgment and conduct, upon the widest observation of facts, material and spiritual? He has no dread of innovation, reform, whether in the applications of labor, or the institutions of society; because he has seen and knows that progress, improvement, is the constant obligation of man's being, individually and socially. He is not satisfied with the present, of his own mind, or of social institutions; but looks forward, striving with patient hope, to a gleaming future, when "that which is perfect shall come, and that which is in part shall be done away." He is conscious that he knows but the minutest portion of the universe and its laws, and is not rash to pronounce anything impossible, however incredible it may appear, and contrary to all former experience. He does not attempt to fix the limits of the possible or the credible; much less to limit them by the actual. Therefore new discoveries in science and art, the announcement of an unheard of law of nature, a new application of elemental force, transcending all that is known, he does not reject with contemptuous skepticism; but hails them as new revelations of the inexhaustible mysteries of the universe. He has faith in man; because he knows him by a wide and profound study of his nature, capacities, and destiny; in his strength as well as his weakness, his spiritual grandeur as well as his physical littleness, his infinitude as well as his feebleness; because he knows that his destiny is endless progress; and that, though the individual, beset by untoward environments, may falter and turn back, and may even, in self-inflicted blindness or insanity, cast down and trample under his feet his spiritual crown; yet the race is ever going forward, the period ever drawing towards its consummation, when even this time-and-space-enveloped world, the finite shall be to every man a symbol of the infinite. This man the world calls a philosopher, a theorist, a visionary, a dreamer; and pronounces him unfit to be entrusted with the practical operations of social life. Had not Teufelsdröckh a true insight into things, when, desert-

ed and given up by his patrons as "a man of genius," he said, "as if the higher did not presuppose the lower; as if he, who can fly into heaven, could not also walk post, if he were resolved on't;" and queerly enough concludes, "The world is an old woman, and mistakes any gilt farthing for a gold coin; whereby being often cheated, she will thenceforth trust nothing but the common copper."

To the so called practical man, whom for distinctness and brevity let me call *the* practical man, the golden age is in the past. The reign of Saturn, if it is not placed in hoariest antiquity, comes no nearer his own era than the times of his father. He is a laudator of the old times, and deploras the changes which have taken place since he was a boy. He is an inveterate conservative, and repudiates all innovations upon establishments. He walks backward through the world, fixing his mournful gaze upon the vanishing glories of the past; and, as "the eyes of a man are not in his hindhead," blind to the kindling splendors of the future behind him, until, as sweeping by, they too become mingled with the past. "Philosophers, we grant, are attached to theories; but really what are called practical men are the greatest theorists in the world; the difference is, that the philosopher's theory is a general view derived from a large induction of authenticated facts; the practical man's theory is a partial view based on the maxims of his nurse or his grandmother, on some unmeaning phrase of sounding words devised and perpetuated by faction, or at best on the induction of his own narrow judgment and limited experience. The false doctrines of some philosophers have produced a certain amount of mischief; but it is as a drop of water to the whole Atlantic, compared with the vast mass of evil perpetuated by the legislation of those, who call themselves emphatically practical men."

Man's knowledge consists in the truth of the ideas, facts, in his mind; his power in their number and just connexion. Ideas are infinite; their relations various,

but regular. The philosopher, as contrasted with the practical man, is by the terms of the comparison supposed to have acquired a great number of ideas, and must, therefore, be in a more favorable position for observing their relations and discrepancies. The observation of these relations, and the application of them to the various objects and business of man's being, is the end of knowledge; is knowledge reduced to practice; practical knowledge. Every idea in the infinite chain of thought has its appropriate place, and it is important to ascertain its true place and connexions. This, the more links we have before us, we shall be more likely to discover. The practical man has, confessedly, fewer than the philosopher, and consequently will be more liable to mistake the true position of each, and to establish false connexions between them. This is even worse than absolute ignorance, for "in order to acquire true knowledge, the wholly ignorant man has only to learn; the partially ignorant [he who has established wrong connexions] has both to unlearn and to learn, and to unlearn is the most difficult task that can be imposed on the human mind."

There is still another difference, which has been glanced at. The philosopher "stands in the middle, looking before and after." The practical man, too, stands in the middle, but he looks only one way. His maxims are drawn from the past, or at the widest from the narrow segment immediately before him. To him "the thing that has been will be, and there is no new thing under the sun." Coming events cast their shadows before them in vain. He cannot see them, for his eyes are turned in an opposite direction. To the philosopher whatever there is of darkness is behind his path; and that is illuminated by the advancing and increasing brightness of the glowing future. To the practical man, the darkness is before his path; what light he has decreasing as the past recedes and is lost in the shoreless inane.

In proportion to the paucity of ideas will be the

tenacity with which they are maintained. Be it supposed, for illustration, that an individual has two ideas. We must needs allow him two, for no man can act with only one, any better than he can walk on one leg; nay, not so well, for he cannot even hop upon it. The whole strength of his conviction will be concentrated upon these two, simply because they are his whole stock. By the laws of the mind, order, arrangement, must exist among its thoughts; if the association is not natural, the mind will force it; for here, as everywhere, "order is heaven's first law." If the two ideas are both true, it may be well. But if they be both false; or if one be true, and the other false; or if, both being true, they are widely separated, and have no natural connexion, except through a chain of intermediate ideas; or even, both being true and contiguous, if they are brought together in erroneous juxtaposition; the practical results of their combination must be mischievous. But he can have no doubt of his ideas, or inferences; for they stand alone in his intellectual firmament, where there is nothing else to disturb the entireness and intensity of his faith. He will deem he has a clear view of the universe, because his two ideas are all of the universe which is visible to him. Hence he is intolerant of opinions opposed to his own, not being able to conceive that what fills his mind with so clear a conviction, should not produce the same in that of others; that even in a mind no better furnished than his own, occupied by the same two ideas, the ideas may have a different arrangement and relation; nor that the same evidence may produce a quite different effect upon different minds, according to the medium through which it is presented, and the number and nature of the objects with which it may be composed.

They were the practical men, who persecuted Jesus, because he taught the spiritual worship of the Father, and rebuked the narrow exclusiveness of the traditional faith resting upon "our fathers worshipped in this mountain." They were the practical men of their



age, who plunged Galileo in a dungeon, for demonstrating a system of the universe, opposed to the common sense of the age, and which contravened the canons of the Church. They are the practical men, who, in all ages, have stoned the prophets, established inquisitions, punished heresy as crime, enacted penal statutes against opinion, extended legislation over the whole business of society, into even man's bosom, making his tastes, habits, private responsibilities, subjects of statute enactments.

The practical man has no faith in man; little in individual men, excepting himself and his sect; because he is ignorant of human nature, or his partial knowledge is derived from his individual nature, or the limited social sphere in which he moves. Hence he deems the notion of man's indefinite progress a chimaera. Man, according to his theory, is a thing to be governed, and the great social problem is to ascertain how little of free agency he may be safely entrusted with. His only idea of man free, without statute law, is that of a ferocious, rabid beast, left without restraint to glut his appetite for carnage. The possibility of individual self-government is not dreamed of in his philosophy. In all states he is the High Church and Tory partisan, and dreads innovation more than the continuance of the most flagrant abuses. Whatever his professed creed may be, he practically believes and acts upon the theological paradox of total depravity, that men are born under the wrath and curse of God, prone to evil and that continually; because he knows something of the vices of mankind, and deems that knowledge of human nature. Man has no absolute rights; none independent of society; none, which he may not be required to surrender to "that incarnation of despotism, that most unintelligible of all abstractions," the public good. Is it the just and highest function of education, as the handmaid of free institutions, as conferring the power of self-government, to produce only such results as these; to convert men into social machines?

Be education practical ; and the more practical any system is, the more perfect it is. This it can never be, unless it has reference to man in his whole nature and destiny ; unless it aims at something higher than to fit men for the routine of petty occupations, for the handicrafts and mechanical business of society ; unless it contemplates for man a nobler destiny than that so strikingly depicted by a living American writer. "Man thus metamorphosed, is a thing, many things. The planter is a man sent into the fields to gather food, and is seldom cheered with the idea of the true dignity of his mission. He sees his bushel and his cart, and sinks into a farmer, instead of *man on a farm*. The tradesman scarce gives an ideal value to his work, but is ridden by the routine of his craft, and his soul is subject to dollars. The priest becomes a form ; the attorney a statute book ; the mechanic a machine ; the sailor a rope of a ship."

Considering education more directly with reference to popular institutions, at the first view a remarkable anomaly is presented. Our nation professes to rely for its permanence upon the general understanding, by the people, of their rights, and of the nature and value of freedom. Yet here there is not, that I am aware of, in any system of education practised among us, any direct provision for teaching the elementary principles of freedom. Wiser than we are the absolutisms of the old world, who are careful, along with the manuals of philosophy and science, to send into their schools catechisms of political duty, inculcating political subjection. They, as well as we, rely upon the intelligence of the people. But where shall we find, in our institutions for education, the text book of man's natural rights, or scarcely even a recognition of them ? In our Colleges and Universities ? Nay, they are wedded to ancient routine, occupied in teaching "dead vocables," and systems of philosophy, that have become obsolete. Social progress has swept by them, and left them back in the dark ages. Not

from them comes the guiding light, and the helpful arm.

In the popular literature? The popular literature is, for the most part, an aristocrat; and, excepting some sounding generalities concerning popular sovereignty, and the majesty of the people (not, however, perceiving man as an individual) uttered in deference to certain antiquated constitutional abstractions of liberty and equal rights; it has hardly a conception of man, except as a mass. There are exceptions; but these scarcely come into the category of *popular* literature. Few are the bards, nor highly praised, who strike the lyre for simple, unranked man; and he is deemed but little better than a fanatic, a "rabid radical," who would pluck the veil of abstraction from acknowledged first truths, and make them practical and universal.

Shall we go down among the elements; to the dust-begrimmed, wayside temples of popular education? There, out of doors and the eye of the birch-sceptred monarchs of those dingy halls of science, there is abundance of practical teaching on the subject. But within, alas, the Peter Parleys and Robin Carvers, with their nutshell compendiums of science, and royal roads to knowledge, monopolize all space, and gibber, to little purpose, about beasts, and fishes, and birds, and other miscellaneous elements.

Or shall we seek the development of our theory of equal rights, where indeed, if anywhere, it should be found, in the commentaries of the *practical* men, written out in the statute book? Worse and worse. The practical men have acted on a theory of their own, through which our grand national theory, scarce with faintest glimmerings, is visible. They recognise man only in the aggregate, and not in the individual; as a many-headed subject of statute regulation; or as a sort of complex machine, not finished, of which it is the province of the legislator to apply certain needful wheels and gauges, checks and balances. Natural rights are here metamorphosed into corporation char-

ters; universal rights are superseded by grants of exclusive privileges; statute prosecutions for the expression of unpopular opinion, stand in the place of the individual right of thought and speech; property becomes of more worth than man; and instead of general laws, extending over every one equal protection, thus give a special legislation. Not there shall we find our text book, or an authentic commentary thereon.

If we seek for the illustrations of our fundamental principles in their results upon the general character and spirit of society, shall we find there the theory of natural rights planted and flourishing in the strong foundations of public opinion? Nay, here least of all. Here, too, individual man is scarcely known, and only as an undistinguishable element of a mass. He does not stand out prominently as a separate integral existence; but, from being a unit, has almost vanished into an infinitesimal fraction. Public opinion, or gigantic associations usurping its attributes, are swallowing up the individual in their huge vortices. All the force there is in man is in his social accidents and connexions; he is not strong by himself, but only by his party. Society has become a machine, or combination of machines. Moral force is losing its power, and giving place to mechanism. By societies of every type and object, by party mechanism, by statutes, which, never more than one form of the expression of public opinion, are now only results of social and party mechanisms; the individual is in danger of becoming nothing, of sinking into oblivion, and leaving time and space to that aggregate irresponsibility, *the public*. And more; he is in danger of losing the power of independent volition, of forsaking a vice, or practising a virtue, without putting himself into the leading-strings of association. Associations assume and control his personal responsibilities, until it will be happy for him if he do not cease to be conscious that he has any. We shall, therefore, seek in vain in society for the illustrations which we are in search of;



but we shall discover something of the modes, "by which the same control under a free government, may be exerted over individual opinion and action, that is exerted over them by despotisms and hierarchies."

But man was not made to be a machine, a fraction; to lose his separate existence, and be incorporated in a mass; nor to suffer his free volitions to be overwhelmed by his social sympathies. It is the mission of education to rescue him from this individual annihilation; to develop the great central law and attribute of his being; that man, each man by himself, in reference to all other men, is essentially and inalienably free, and the brother and equal of every man. This great first truth must be roused from its almost dead sleep in constitutions and popular declamation, and brought out again, with new annunciations, into the high-ways and bye-ways of society; into the humble road-side schoolhouse, and into the halls where high science has her throne. Instead of being a parchment formula, let it be made a living, all-pervading energy; presiding in the assemblies of legislation; and giving an irresistible, but tranquil and legitimate power to public opinion. From this central principle let all social doctrines radiate; by this primary law be all social maxims and usages tried. It will then be perceived that society, or government, as embodying and representing the material force of society, is but the creature of man's individual freedom, and not the controller. In its ultimate analysis, society is an association for mutual protection; the security of each individual in the possession and exercise of his natural, absolute rights. Within the limits of those rights, society has no authority of government over him; and if she exercise any, she is guilty of tyranny; the laws, she enacts to limit or restrain them, are repugnant to the higher law of man's nature, and of no validity. This freedom, these rights, are a wall of sanctity around each individual, which society should not dare to scale, which cannot be broken over without unspeakable injury to society itself.

On the recognition of these principles, the stability, even the existence, of free communities depend. I can form no conception of a freedom in society, of which the freedom of individual man is not the primary element; of man as man, with rights not derived from society, prior to society, beyond the control of all other men, beyond the reach of government, laws, or public opinion. It is no impeachment of the validity of these rights, that the individual may and does abuse them. The power to abuse them is a necessary element of liberty. "God leaves man in his freedom, and does not control it, though man, in abusing it, brings damnation to his soul." The legitimate exercise of freedom can never work harm to others, or to society. There can be no collision between the clear rights of one individual, and those of another, any more than in the use of the all-pervading elements; for the rights are identical and universal. "So long as one does not trespass upon the rights of others, nor place obstacles in the way of their full and free exercise, society has no authority to interfere with his course."

These principles are in the highest degree practical; for in man's freedom lies his power of full and perfect development. They should be made the starting-point, and fixed as landmarks along the whole course of practical education. They should cheer the school-boy's wearisome discipline with hope and confidence. To man they should be a universal presence, filling him with the fulness of strength, courage, and indomitable energy for all the "sublime possibilities" of his being.

ART. II. — NO ERROR CAN BE USEFUL ; NO TRUTH CAN BE INJURIOUS. A DISCOURSE, BY THE EDITOR.

I HAVE not taken my text from the Bible. The practice of taking a passage of Scripture for a text, when one is about to give a discourse, is not always convenient, and seldom answers any very good purpose. Every discourse should be upon some one subject, designed to teach some one truth, to correct some error, to inculcate some useful lesson, or to bring home to the conscience some one duty. This subject, this truth, this error, this lesson, or this duty should always be distinctly stated, and clearly set forth ; and if this be done, it matters little whether it be by means of a passage from the Old Testament or the New, by a passage from some other book, or without either.

Sermons are in general quite too formal, quite too dull, and quite too destitute of far-reaching and quickening thought. "Dull as a sermon," is a common saying, and will be till sermonizers break loose from their fetters, and become able to speak out, in free and natural language, their thoughts and feelings as they rise fresh and living to their own minds and hearts. But they will hardly do this till their congregations become able to receive strong and living thought in free and natural language ; not till the people come to understand what is the great end and aim of preaching. Preachers who comprehend their mission do not preach for the sake of producing a sermon, they do not prepare a discourse for the sake of preparing a discourse ; or if they do, they are languid, uninteresting, and unprofitable. No man can speak well, or with interest, unless he speak because he hath something he wishes to say. If he have no topic on which he has thoughts struggling for utterance, if he have no great truth he is anxious to bring out, if he see no error in faith or in practice that he burns to correct, no lesson that he feels himself commanded to unfold, no duty that he dare not refrain from enforcing, in vain

will he attempt to speak; in vain will he select his words, round his periods, and polish his sentences; his words will be cold, and his discourse will make as little impression on his hearers as oil in running over polished marble.

To be eloquent one must be in earnest; to speak with power one must speak on a subject which presses heavy on his heart, must speak out of a full mind, from a soul laboring with great thoughts, lofty aims, and firm resolves. He must speak himself, throw out his very soul, and breath his very being into the souls of those he addresses. The pulpit, with us, except in rare cases, does not allow a man to do this. It studies to be decorous, and is afraid of uttering a loud and stirring voice, lest it offend good breeding and sin against correct taste. It is too calm, too polished, too genteel, to be efficient. It wants energy, freedom, earnestness. Men do not speak from it in the tone of settled conviction, and solemn earnestness.

To contribute my share towards correcting the evil, I break myself from the hamper of a text; I abandon the usual pulpit style; and, when I please, stray beyond the usual range of pulpit topics. I wish to see united with the eloquence of the pulpit the eloquence which has hitherto been called forensic, and that which has been accounted appropriate only to the popular assembly. I want the pulpit to send forth a voice that shall instruct, warn, rebuke, kindle, inspire men on all subjects which can concern them as human beings, as social, moral, religious beings. In my judgment the time has passed by, when the pulpit had nothing to do but to describe the terrors of the day of judgment, and compel the sinner to enter the kingdom of heaven by arguments, drawn only from the wailing and the gnashing of teeth of the damned.

Men's minds have in these days been somewhat expanded. They run over more topics; they think and reason and speak on more subjects than they once did. They have read beyond the Shorter and even the Longer Catechism, and cannot be made to confine their faith



within the circle of the Saybrook Platform, the Westminster Confession, or the Thirty-nine Articles. New interests have come up, a new class of thoughts and feelings has come up, undreamed of in former days, and these new interests, new thoughts, and feelings must be addressed from the pulpit, or the pulpit will be supplanted by the lecture room.

I make not these remarks for the purpose of censuring others, but in justification of myself, of my departures hitherto in many instances from the ordinary style of sermonizing, of still greater departures which I may make hereafter. I am not satisfied with confining religion to one little corner of human affairs and concerns, nor in restricting its ministers to a certain prescribed range of topics. I would spread religion over every thing; and I claim the right to bring to this desk, and to utter without reserve, my honest opinions on all topics with which I have any acquaintance, and with which I deem it useful for those to whom I speak to be acquainted. I do not consider myself as stepping beyond my bounds when I speak of art, of science, of industry, of politics, of political or domestic economy. Man's whole nature, and all his relations, duties, and interests are before me, and as a minister of Jesus, I hold I have the right to discuss any or all of them; and I shall do it in my own way and time, and shall not allow myself to be affected by the remark, "that is not a proper subject for the pulpit." Is it a subject which concerns Humanity in any of her multifarious relations? If so, I hold it to be a proper subject for the pulpit.

And now I have alluded to this subject, I have another word to say. Everybody knows there is a sort of pulpit twang, and a pulpit cast of countenance, and a pulpit phraseology, which many deem it the bounden duty of every clergyman to observe. Who does not know that clergymen do not usually speak in the same style and manner, in the same language and tone, that a man does who rises to address an assembly on some public occasion, for the purpose

of effecting some immediate object? Now, I know that in a community like this, where a particular taste in this respect is formed, a free, natural, earnest manner will be censured. Sometimes it will be said the speaker, if he use strong language, is coarse; if he give utterance to his thoughts as they rise, that he wants reverence, that he is not becoming in his expressions.

To all this, I have but a single remark; that is, let no one speak unless he have something to say, and then let him speak as he best can to effect the object for which he speaks. Let him speak right on, with an entire forgetfulness of everything but his subject; let him not think whether his language be coarse or refined, reverent or irreverent, and if possible leave his hearers no spare time or attention to criticise him. No man who comes before an audience full of his subject, especially if he come forward as the champion of Reform, but will seem to many coarse, homely, and irreverent, in his modes of expression; but will perhaps offend a fastidious taste as well as perturb a guilty conscience.

Having made these remarks, which I hope will be considered, I proceed to my subject, and that subject is one which follows closely in the train of what I have been saying, and is involved in the remark with which I commenced, "No error can be useful, no truth can be injurious." People do not generally believe this. When, some years ago, my mind was affected with certain doubts on the subject of religion, I frequently permitted those doubts to escape me in my preaching. This was perceived, and a number of the clergymen of the denomination with which I was then connected, friends and acquaintances of mine, reproved me with considerable severity,—not for entertaining doubts, but for expressing them. Religion, they said, might indeed be a mere illusion, but then it was a salutary illusion, one without which society could not subsist; and therefore, whatever my belief respecting it, I

ought, as a friend to mankind, to do my best to uphold it. More are ready to say the same thing than we commonly imagine.

This same belief in the utility of error and the danger of truth, is manifested by a very common remark: "That is indeed true, but the people cannot bear it. It is necessary to be prudent in telling even the truth. Too much light is hurtful to weak eyes." So it is to be inferred that too much truth is hurtful to weak minds. Throughout society there is a feeling that some truths ought not to be told, and on the other hand, that there are many errors which it will not do to expose, many salutary fictions or illusions, which it is necessary to uphold for the peace and order of society.

Now it is against this distrust of truth on the one hand, and this belief in the salutary tendency of certain errors, on the other, that I enter a solemn protest. It is extremely embarrassing, extremely troublesome to the preacher. It is a hard matter to decide how much truth we may safely tell, and how much error it is salutary to maintain. The matter becomes quite complicated, and one cannot help feeling that he may have in that sermon, for instance, told a truth which he ought not to have told, and in that other discourse, exposed an error, which for the peace and order of society he should have sustained. It simplifies the matter exceedingly, if you allow me to tell the whole truth, and ask me to tell nothing but the truth. I have comparatively an easy task if I have only to ask, What is true? And when I have told faithfully what I believe to be true, my conscience will be at peace. And if we may say, no truth can be hurtful, then we need inquire only, what is true, and leave the question of its utility or inutility alone.

I know not a more monstrous proposition than this, which some men entertain, that error is sometimes salutary, that there are some errors which it is wrong to expose. To say that error is or can be in any case beneficial, is to say that God has so constituted things

that the truth will not do to be told. That is, he has made things so imperfect, that they can move on harmoniously only by moving in opposition to his design; that man's nature is such, that he must falsify it, before he can receive the good he stands in need of. This is about as reasonable as it would be to give the eye, which is made for light, darkness, and the ear, in order that we may hear, not sound, but silence the most perfect.

But the notion, monstrous as it is, is of long standing. Most of the early Christian Fathers adopted it, and used avowedly, — at least some of them, — falsehood as a medicine. And Eusebius himself, the historian of the Church, and who is almost our only authority for the history of the Church during the first three centuries, tells us, that he has not been careful always to relate the whole truth, but such events as would most redound to the glory of the Church. The priesthood in all ages and countries have acted on the principle that it is necessary to deceive the people, or to suffer the people to be deceived for their own good. And not the priesthood only, but legislators, statesmen, and rulers. The world, up to this day, has been governed mainly by means of fraud, of deception, craft, by suffering the people to be deluded, and by hindering them from becoming acquainted with the truth.

And why has this been so? And why have the people submitted to it? Why has it been so? Simply because in all ages and countries one portion of mankind has found its own interest in gulling and deceiving the other. Go among your North American savages, and almost the first thing you meet is the juggler, a sort of priest, professing to have a superior light, and to hold intercourse with the invisible, and to be able to perform various miracles. He is, in consequence of the general belief in his powers, a most necessary personage; he must be present on all solemn occasions; at birth and at death, in sickness or in grief; he must give his counsel to the tribe, and



may create war or peace almost at his pleasure. Now this juggler fares well. Every hunter has a portion of game, a haunch of venison, or a beaver skin to present him, and every woman, who consults him as to the fate of her lover, husband, or child, is ready to plant or harvest his corn. He is spared the necessary labor for his support. He has not to share the fatigues of the chase nor to brave the dangers of war, unless he choose. Now, will this juggler be willing to tell the people the truth, that he is in fact nothing but a cheat, and that he is merely gulling them? By no means. On some topics he may speak the truth, but when it comes to his own case he will take care to have it believed by the people that they cannot subsist without jugglers.

These jugglers, which we meet among savages, become, in proportion as the race advances from the savage state, sacerdotal corporators or priests, as the priests of ancient Egypt, the Magi among the Medes and Persians, the Levites among the Jews, the Druids among the Celts, the Bonzes in China, and the Bramins in India. In all the nations of antiquity, with the exception of Greece and Arabia, sacerdotal castes or corporations were instituted. They were hereditary. They governed the people. Nothing in public or in private life could be undertaken without their permission and advice. Some idea you may form of the extent of their power, and the variety of their duties, by studying the Pentateuch or five books of Moses. The Levitical priesthood, I am inclined to believe, was less burdensome, than that of almost any other nation; but if you will examine its regulations, ascertain the cities which they possessed, the tithes which were their due, and the various perquisites of their office, you will find that they claimed by right nearly one hundred per cent. of the whole income of the land. In point of fact, according to the Mosaic law, the whole nation of the Hebrews were bound to labor for the exclusive benefit of the priesthood. I do not believe the law was ever complied with; but

the priests took good care to have it spread over everything. The people became weary of the burden, and sighed for a king, who should protect them from the exorbitant demands of the priesthood.

The Egyptian priests received one third of the whole income of Egypt, and owned one third of its soil. The Bramins enjoy like advantages. Similar advantages were possessed by the Celtic and Scandinavian priests.

But this is not the worst. These corporations imposed penances, often of the most painful kind, enjoined rites and duties of the most absurd, cruel; or licentious character. In Babylon they made it the duty of every woman to prostitute her person at a certain religious festival. Crimes too horrible to be mentioned, and which you will find darkly hinted in the first chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, were commanded and made religious duties by these priesthoods. Human sacrifices were ordinary affairs. Mutilations of the body, the sacrifice of all the affections, of all that is holy in man, of all that is chaste in woman, was deemed necessary to secure the favor of the gods.

To suppose that these corporations, these priests, who were in many respects really well instructed, believed this necessary for the salvation of mankind, were to be charitable to a fault. The priests knew what they were about. The people, however, were ignorant, and the priests labored with all their might to keep them ignorant. The Bramins poured boiling oil down the throat of any one not a Bramin, who dared look into one of their sacred books; the Druids, the priests of Egypt, of Ethiopia, and Judea were not less careful to preserve their secrets, and not less severe against those who should pry into or divulge their mysteries. What has been in these days alleged against an institution which still exists among us, was true of the ancient priests; and the man who should disclose what he learned in the temples to the uninitiated, would have had inflicted upon him all, and

more too, than is implied in the horrid oaths which some say are taken by Free Masons.

You readily perceive by this, that these ancient priests did not teach the people truth; they did not seek to enlighten them. They went on the principle, that truth is dangerous, and error useful. And why? Because the truth was dangerous to them. Had the truth been told, had their real character been known, the people would have despised them, rebelled against them, and delivered themselves from their bondage. This was what the priests feared, and this was why they locked up all knowledge from the people.

But why did the people submit to the oppression of the priesthood? Did they not know that they suffered? Yes, they knew that they suffered; they could not but see the immense distance between themselves and the priests; but you must bear in mind that these priests were the educators of the people, and that they formed the conscience of the people. They told the people and made the people believe, that what they suffered was requisite for their salvation; they made the chaste matron, or the modest virgin believe, that the prostitution enjoined was commanded by the gods. If the people complained of the distinctions which existed in society, they were immediately quieted by being assured the gods willed those distinctions. Were the unnumbered many toiling from morning till night for a few, for the exclusive benefit of a few, they were kept quiet, because the priest had made them believe it was their duty to do so. The priests corrupted the people in order to control them or to use them. In this case you can clearly perceive why the notion should be entertained, that error is sometimes beneficial, and that truth is hurtful. Error always is needed by those who have unjust aims, and truth is dangerous to men of evil intentions or evil deeds. Men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil.

Suppose some one had gone into Egypt or Judea, and begun to teach the people that they received no

benefit from the corporations they were supporting, that they supported them merely for the benefit of the corporators, and should say to them, "Abandon these sacerdotal corporations to themselves; the gods do not require you to yield up your judgments to their direction, and your bodies to be used for their profit or pleasure," what think ye the priests would have done? Why, they would have crucified him as they did Jesus of Nazareth. And on what pretence? On the pretence that he was stirring up sedition, and endangering the peace and order of society; that is, in plain English, because he was destroying the craft by which the priests obtained their livelihood, their wealth, and consideration.

Be assured, my hearers, that no man is ever afraid of the truth unless he is conscious of being one whom the truth would indict; unless he has some interest which he feels he can maintain only by turning away men's eyes from beholding it. This is the case with nearly all governments. Governments have usually formed to themselves an interest diverse from that of the governed, and consequently are obliged to make use of fraud and deception to promote it. There is not a government in Europe, that could stand twenty-four hours, if one half of the truth respecting it were known to the people. Governments have an instinctive sense of this, and therefore take good care to keep the truth concealed. They appoint all the ministers of religion, all the schoolmasters, and exert their whole power to make the people cling to falsehood.

I have no means of making an exact estimate, but I suppose that in England, a common man pays to the government and nobility about seven eighths of all he produces. And for what? Why, he gives seven eighths of his income, to pay for being governed. It is very nearly so in all other European countries. The people who labor, are compelled to labor three fourths of their time, at least, to pay the government for governing them. The government begins by making the



people terribly afraid of anarchy, by making them believe that the government is their lord and master, and that it must be sustained at all hazards; and when these poor people are disposed to complain of their hard condition, they teach them that the peace and order of society, the blessings of good government, can be obtained only at such a price. Now government knows, or ought to know, that this is false; but it finds the falsehood profitable to itself, and it will therefore strike with its sword him who should attempt to correct or expose it.

Even our own government hardly dares confide in truth. It believes, or rather those who have the most influence in dictating its policy believe, that it is necessary to deceive the people. I mention now only one instance in which it does it. Everybody knows that government is a very expensive thing, and that it is a very weak thing without money; but money is a thing the people do not like to part with. Government wants money and the people do not want to pay it; and government is afraid that they will not pay it, if it state openly and frankly to every man what is his proportion; so it undertakes to do indirectly, in a round-about, covert way, what it dares not undertake to do openly. It says, every pound of tea, every pound of sugar, every yard of broadcloth, &c. &c., shall pay a certain duty, at the place where it is imported. This is paid by the merchant, and the people at large think nothing about it. The merchant cares nothing about it, because he gets it back again in the higher price of his merchandise. By this means government obtains the money it wants, and the people do not perceive nor care precisely by what means. No one is conscious of having been taxed, and all are quiet, and government uses its money very much as it pleases. Yet a more iniquitous way of raising money it were exceedingly difficult to devise. It is precisely the way to exonerate the rich from bearing any share of the public burthen, and to throw its whole weight upon the poor. But the government, and rich men

who uphold the measure, will by no means thank me for saying so. And it would be counted a sin against the peace and order of society, to tell the whole truth about it. No advocate of this indirect way of taxation dares, if he understand it, tell the whole truth respecting it. In a word, governments and individuals are always opposed to proclaiming truths which tend to destroy their privileges, prerogatives, or interests; and they always labor to corrupt the people; that is, so to teach them, that they may be controlled or used for the exclusive interest or profit of government or of individuals.

Every man, who is acquainted at all with the majority of governments with which this earth is blessed, knows very well that their chief blessing is the privilege they confer on the many of being taxed three fourths or seven eighths of the proceeds of their labor for the exclusive benefit of the few. It is not quite the same here as elsewhere; at least, government is not the same here; in theory it has no interest diverse from that of the people, and it does not tax labor quite so much; but, in point of fact, labor is taxed exorbitantly, even here. What benefit does the laborer derive from those measures, which enable a few to work him for their own profit? Yet the advocates of measures of government, of financial, commercial, and manufacturing systems, which tend directly to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer, are very careful to assert, that all this is for the benefit of the poor, and to warn the laboring classes against those who would tell them otherwise.

The favored classes would always teach the less favored, that they, the favored classes, submit to be the wealthy, the educated, the refined, the elevated classes, for the especial benefit of the poor, the ignorant, and the vulgar. They labor with all their might to corrupt the minds of the less favored classes, and to make them quiet under their sufferings. God has given riches to some and withheld them from others; he has made some to be high and others to be low;

he, who murmurs, murmurs not against man merely, but against God; and superstition, even religion is brought to shield the oppressor, and to rivet still firmer the chains of the slave.

I touch a point on which it is considered dangerous to tell the truth, and on which one needs some courage to tell the whole truth. Yet if men were honest in their aims, and wanted only their share of God's gifts, no one would suffer by the truth's being told; no one would shrink from having it told.

It is a truth nobody can gainsay, that labor is the sole creator of wealth; the laborer then should be its sole possessor. If justice were done, we should go on the principle laid down by the Apostle Paul, "if any man will not work, neither shall he eat." But what confusion would the proclamation of such a truth produce! Verily, the preaching of such a doctrine would turn the world upside down.

The laboring classes formed, not very wisely in my judgment, a few years since, certain associations, called Trades Unions, and straightway the hue and cry was raised; property was declared to be in danger, the peace and order of society were threatened, and in some cases the law was twisted against the working-men, and they were punished because they refused to work for the wages offered them by their employers. Now, at this moment\* a combination is entered into by the merchants and bankers, by which law and justice are set at defiance; by which the laborer and the whole community, except money-lenders and money-borrowers, are and cannot but be defrauded, and forthwith the public press lauds this combination as proceeding from almost unprecedented magnanimity and nobility of soul, and love of country and of man.

Now this does not all proceed from stupidity, from ignorance. It is craft, dishonesty. Nobody needs pretend that it is otherwise. Men are ignorant, I know, and cannot see the truth because the guinea

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\* This was written in the summer of 1837.

hides it ; but they know better than they act. I, however, have not introduced these topics for the purpose of declaiming against any portion of the community ; I have merely done it to show why, on the one hand, men are opposed to having the truth told, and why, on the other, the people submit to be deceived. I have merely broached the matter. Much more must be said before it will be placed in a clear light.

My conclusion is, that people are afraid of the truth because they are conscious of ends which the truth opposes ; and that they who have these ends are so situated, that they have the control of the public conscience and the forming of the public mind.

Now I may be wrong in all I have said. Be it so. Let truth be free to combat me, and no harm can arise. We are all liable to err, and the only way to avoid the mischievous consequences of error is to communicate freely and unreservedly our opinions, one to another ; to give them modestly but frankly to the public, and let them be canvassed.

He who is conscious of none but honest ends will never refuse to hear the truth, and will never withhold what he believes to be the truth from others. Not a little have mankind suffered because men have been deterred by interest, by regard for friends, by love of peace, by fear of producing confusion or strife, from telling their whole thought, from uttering themselves freely and fully on topics on which they had thought long and deeply, and on which they were qualified to instruct their country or their race.

I know the truth is often like a sword. I know there are times and places when if you tell certain truths you must look out for a convulsion. Jesus was the way, and the truth, the truth itself, and yet he said he had come not to bring peace but a sword. It is the truth most needed, and which it is the most criminal to withhold, that produces the most confusion, and occasions the most reproach to him who tells it. The truth, which can be told without producing any excitement, is not the truth that needs to be told, for it is a truth which already reigns.



I know of but one restriction as to this matter of telling the truth, that is, never undertake to tell a truth when you cannot tell it. Be sure that you have the truth, and that you can so utter it, that it will be taken for what it really is, and then utter it boldly, in a mild and gentle voice, if you choose, in trumpet tones, if you please.

I close with one word to those that hear. If what you hear be a truth, and you are convinced that it is truth, find no fault with it, and never suffer yourselves to regret that it has been told. It may have disturbed your repose, swept away your old dependencies, broken up old associations; no matter; never mind; if it be the truth, thank God for it; though it may pain you it will do you good. Bear in mind, that as "no error can be useful, so no truth can be harmful."

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ART. III. — *Manual of Political Ethics, designed chiefly for the Use of Colleges and Students at Law. Part II., Political Ethics Proper.* By FRANCIS LIEBER. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1839. 8vo. pp. 668.

WE noticed in a preceding number at some length the former volume of this work, and we then advised the author, before publishing the remainder, to keep his materials on hand for some years, in order to give a greater degree of maturity to his thoughts and style. We did not much expect that this piece of advice would be acted on, and are therefore not surprised at the early appearance of this large and thick volume.

We still think that the author would have improved his work in both its parts, by keeping it longer on the anvil; but there are, nevertheless, defects in it which no amount of labor employed in polishing and matur-

ing would entirely remove. The two leading objections to the work are the foreign air that pervades the language, and the want of any precise and distinct subject.

The language consists substantially of English words put together on the principles of arrangement and construction belonging to the idiom of Germany. The result is a dialect not only inelegant, but at times almost comic;—an effect entirely at variance with the character of the work. Thus, in quoting from a French dictionary a remark upon the employment of informers by the government, our author does it into English in the following singular style.

“The French dictionary says *ad verbum* Mouchard with much *naïveté*. Those who have the misfortune to employ these abject persons, *believe to disguise their contemptibleness* by calling them *observers*.”

To avoid indulging in a hearty fit of laughter at the perusal of this passage, would probably be with most persons in good health, what the execution of the order to slaughter the Protestants on St. Bartholomew's day was to Viscount d'Orthèz : *une chose non faisable*, or as our author has it, an *unfeasible* thing.

In the same way, in treating the interesting subject of woman, the author throws a comic air over the whole discussion, by employing frequently the German form, *the woman*, instead of the English, *woman's*, or *women*. If he were required to translate Schiller's beautiful little poem, *Die Würde der Frauen*, into English, he would probably render the title, *The Dignity of the Women*, instead of *The Worth of Woman*. The different effect of these forms is easily seen by substituting one for the other in any part of the poem alluded to. Thus, if instead of

“Woman invites him with bliss in her smile,  
To cease from his toil and be happy a while,”

we substitute

*The woman* invites him with bliss in her smile,  
To cease, &c.

the effect changes at once from the serious to the com c.

Again :

“ Woman contented in silent repose,  
Enjoys in its beauty life's flower as it blows.”

On reading this couplet, the ear is soothed by the harmony of the language, and the imagination gratified by the beauty of the image; the judgment acquiesces in the correctness of the thought. The effect is a quiet, serene satisfaction. Substitute *the woman* for *woman* in the first line, and every reader, not provided with a diaphragm of adamant, bursts at once into a fit of laughter. So true it is, as Napoleon remarked, that there is only one step from the sublime, — and we may add the pathetic, — to the ridiculous. *Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas.*

When Frederic the Unique attempted to write French poetry, he took the precaution to put it into the hands of Voltaire for correction before he published it. Voltaire was accustomed to describe the operation, which he performed upon it, under the figure of *washing the king's soiled linen*. The wits of Paris remarked at the time, that Voltaire did not do his work thoroughly, and that he should have passed the royal linen through *two or three more waters*. — Dr. Lieber, we believe, submits his lucubrations to a similar process; and if he must publish in a language, which he really does not and probably never will write with either correctness or elegance, he is perfectly right in so doing; but we must in conscience say to him that the literary washerwomen, whom he employs, slight their work at least as much as Voltaire did his, and do not give him his money's worth.

Take for another example the following precious specimen of the Babylonish. In speaking of the employment, by the Pope and the Cardinals, of their family connexions, a practice commonly designated under the name of *Nepotism*, Dr. Lieber remarks :

“ The crime and plunder which *was* [were] connected with nepotism, *is* [are] appalling : State property was alienated and changed into hereditary principalities for the *Nepots*.”

The introduction of rail-roads has recently enriched our language with the French word *depôt*, which is commonly pronounced with a full enunciation of every letter, so as to form a complete double rhyme with *tea-pot*. We cannot but congratulate our poetical friends upon the acquisition of another new word of precisely the same form which will supply them, if necessary, with materials for a triplet, founded on this most delectable "concord of sweet sounds."

In good earnest, why should not Dr. Lieber either write his works in German, of which he is probably a master, and have them fairly translated into English, or if he prefer writing them in English himself, wait until he has acquired the command of our idiom, which at present he certainly has not, but with a few years more usage probably might have? We entertain no other than the most friendly intentions when we seriously advise him, as we did before, to refrain from publishing for the present, and give himself more time to mature his thoughts and his language.

So much for the style of the work before us, which in all books, and especially in a book intended chiefly for the use of students in schools and colleges, is a matter of no small importance. Buffon said that *style was the whole man*; meaning probably that a man's style is a complete index to his whole intellectual and moral character. However this may be, and we must own that we do not adopt implicitly this opinion of the eloquent naturalist, we may well say, that for popular effect at least, *the style is the whole book*. The soundest reasoning, unless recommended by an agreeable style, fails of effect because it is not read.

The other objection to the present work, which we mentioned at the outset, is of a more substantial character, and lies in this, that it has no precise and well defined subject.

Ethics, as the science of morals,—in common parlance, moral philosophy,—admits of two great divisions, which treat respectively of the conduct of nations and of that of individuals. The former is



commonly called the law of nations, and is what we should naturally expect to find in a work entitled *Political Ethics*. This whole division of ethics, however, our author expressly excludes, reserving it perhaps for a separate treatise. The other division, which prescribes rules for the private conduct of individuals, is of course foreign to the subject. What then remains to occupy these two thick volumes? The author himself seems to have been rather at a loss to solve this question, and has foraged far and wide to collect materials. The first volume, as we have seen in our notice of it, is wholly introductory, and contains two distinct treatises on the great subjects of Morals and Politics, each much more important in itself than that of *political ethics*, on any natural explanation of the terms, can well be supposed to be. In the second volume, now before us, and which comprehends the principal work, the author seems to have had on his mind, as a subject, the conduct of the individual in matters connected with government. But this is a quite narrow, if not wholly barren field of discussion. The individual, as a member of the community, may act either in a public or a private capacity; may be either in or out of office. In the former case he represents the state, and his conduct is governed by the law of nature and nations; in the latter, he has no concern with the state but to obey the laws. This single phrase, obey the laws, seems to constitute of itself the whole code of political ethics, as the term is explained by our author.

We find, accordingly, as we should expect, that this second volume is made up substantially, like the former, of a series of digressions. Thus we have a succession of chapters on Perseverance, Moderation, Ambition, Gratitude, and Continence, or, as our author prefers to call it, *Continency*. Friendship and Love find their place. Education and Religion are severally discussed. *The Woman* has a section of her own. All these topics belong to the department of morals. On the other hand, we have a number of chapters

which treat of subjects belonging properly to politics or law, such as those on Representative Government, on War, on the Right of Instruction, on Parties, on the Liberty of the Press, and on Juries. The author endeavors to connect these foreign topics in a loose way with what he proposes as his immediate subject. Thus he begins the chapter on Continenence by remarking, that "Continenence, a virtue demanded by all moral systems and all the purer religions, is an element of great importance under a civil point of view." The development of this text makes up the chapter, which consists of twenty or thirty pages. In the same way Ambition, Gratitude, Friendship, Love, and *The Woman*, are brought within the sphere of *Political Ethics*. All this shows very clearly the want in the author of a distinct and precise conception of his subject. The two great divisions of Ethics, as we have remarked above, prescribe respectively the proper rules of conduct for the individual, considered in a political and in a private capacity. A steady observance of the rules applicable to either of these departments will, no doubt, render the individual more useful in the other. An upright judge will be, as such, a more valuable citizen than he otherwise would have been, because his station will give his good example a wider influence. In the same way a temperate citizen will make, other qualifications being the same, a better judge, general, or ambassador, than a drunkard. But this consideration can have no effect in determining what the rules are that belong respectively to these departments of conduct. The obligation, not to be a drunkard, is common to the judge and the general, with all the other citizens. When we inquire into the duties that devolve upon him in his public capacity, or generally when we inquire into the political duties of the citizen, we leave out of view the merely private virtues as foreign to the subject. The dissertations on *continenence* and on the physiology of *the woman*, are as much out of place in the work before us, as they would be in Burns's *Justice of the Peace*, or Vattel's

Treatise on the Law of Nature and Nations. . On the other hand, the chapters that treat on subjects belonging directly to politics, such as those on the Liberty of the Press, and on Representative Government, are still more obviously out of place, all such topics being previously excluded by the author himself in laying out his plan. Thus if all the irrelevant matter were stricken out, there would in fact be nothing left in the book.

If the materials with which we are furnished in the present volume were of real value, we should object less than we have done to the form. Unfortunately this is not the case. In this respect, the essential characteristics of the present volume are the same as those of the former one. It evinces extensive reading, but no power of methodical arrangement, or correct, precise, and original thought. It conveys of course no real instruction. We deem it unnecessary to go over the contents in detail, but will advert particularly to one or two of the more important passages.

In noticing the former volume, we pointed out, as an omission in the treatise on Politics, the absence of anything like a complete discussion of the great modern invention of *Representative Government*, and added that, in the little which he had said upon the subject, the author had mistaken its character. In the present volume, where such a discussion is out of place, he has treated the subject in several chapters, adhering to the same erroneous principles which he had professed before. We cannot of course enlarge upon this great topic within the narrow limits now remaining to us, but will add a few remarks upon our author's views.

The system of Representative Democracy, as exemplified in the political institutions of the United States, has been pronounced by one of the greatest writers and statesmen of modern Europe, (M. de Chateaubriand,) to be the most brilliant scientific discovery of modern times. The virtue of it lies in reconciling the possibility of free government with

the security from foreign conquest and sudden internal commotion that can be enjoyed only in large States. Communities which govern themselves on the democratic principle, and without the aid of representation, must be very limited in extent, and are of course liable to be swept away by the first invader, or destroyed by any accidental domestic convulsion. Such has been in fact the fate of all the free states of ancient and modern times without exception. Such communities have and can have neither stability nor independence. By the aid of representation, the forms and principles of democracy may be spread over regions of indefinite extent, and sustained by resources which the mightiest neighbors are compelled to respect.

This explanation of the leading idea in the system of representative government, which we suppose to be the one generally received, is too simple to satisfy our author. He treats the subject in the following superior style.

"If we resort to representatives only because we cannot any longer meet in the market ourselves, the whole representative system amounts to nothing more than a *second hand* contrivance; something which may be good enough, and with which we must put up since we cannot any longer have the true and essential thing itself,—the ancient, pure, real, and visible market democracy; a political *pis-aller*; something indirect and circuitous."

This is a precious specimen of the figure of speech commonly called *nonsense*. We employ a lever or a pulley to raise a weight which we cannot lift with our hands. Does this prove that levers and pulleys are *second-hand contrivances*? We make use of a telescope to see a distant object which we cannot discern with the unassisted eye. Does this show that the telescope is an optical *pis-aller*?

In pursuing the subject, our author inquires with equal sagacity why, if representative government be a mere substitute for pure democracy, we do not at once reject the former, and return to the latter? Why not split into a number of city-states again?



This is about as wise a question as it would be to ask why, since the telescope is a mere substitute for the naked eye, we do not at once reject the telescope, and return to the simple, unassisted vision. In the same way we might ask why, if forks be a mere substitute for fingers, we do not at once abandon the use of the modern invention, and like the Eastern nations, plunge our five digits at once into the dish? Representative democracy is a great practical improvement on *simple*, or as our author prefers to call it *market*, democracy, so great an improvement that it has been regarded as the most remarkable modern discovery, not merely in politics, but in science at large. Our author, when informed of this, gravely inquires why, if representative democracy be a mere improvement upon a former system, we do not at once reject it and return to the old and exploded method? Such a question carries of course its own answer, and we may add, its own commentary with it.

As our author rejects the common theory of representative government, we feel some curiosity to know what his views are. Unfortunately his manner of explaining himself on this, as on all other parts of his work, is extremely vague, and he does not succeed in making his ideas at all clear. The nearest approach to a distinct and tangible statement is in the following passage.

"By the representative system, we obtain these two advantages. We restrict the impulse of the mass which is inherent to [in] the mass as such, and we avoid the being ruled by one leader as the Athenians in the latter portion of their history always were. We the people, therefore, are not absent from the legislative halls because for local reasons we cannot be there, but because we ought not to be there as people, as mass; for the same reason that in monarchies the king is not allowed to be present in the halls of justice, or as the legislators cannot debate in the presence of the monarch. In both cases the reason is the same. The prince, that is, the powerholder, must be limited and circumscribed by law," &c.

It is hardly necessary to insist upon the incorrect-

ness of these ideas. So far is the law in a Representative or any other government from being intended to restrict the *prince*,—taking this term as a general name for the law-giving power,—that it is the expression of his will. The law is not intended to act at all upon the law-giving power. Its action is upon the individual. In this country the state is not only not restricted by law, but is expressly exempted by the constitution from liability to any legal process. “We the People” not only have a right “to be in the legislative halls,” that is, to make the law which is to govern us in our individual capacity, but we are the only rightful law-giving power. If the community is not to make the law for itself, by whom shall it be made? By some other community? By some one or more privileged families? Or, in Mr. Jefferson’s language, have we found angels in the shape of kings to make the law for us?

So much for one of the two supposed advantages of a Representative government. The other is equally questionable. “We avoid,” says the author, “the being ruled by one leader, as the Athenians in the latter portion of their history always were.” How does this appear? We see no reason why “one leader” may not exercise a decided preponderance in a representative body, as well as in a purely popular one. Experience is in fact directly opposed to our author’s view. There are usually in representative bodies one or more persons exercising precisely the same sort of influence which is exercised by the leaders in a popular assembly. In either case, if there happen to be among these one of a very commanding character, he monopolizes the greater part of the influence, which is more commonly divided in unequal portions among a number. Did not Pitt sway the British House of Commons, and through it the nation, for twenty years in succession, with at least as complete a mastery as Pericles possessed in the assembly of Athens? Did Aristides, Themistocles, Alcibiades, Cymon, or any other popular leader ever reign more

despotically over that "fierce democratic" than Mirabeau did over the National Assembly of France?

The great virtue of the Representative principle lies in this, that it accomplishes the union, which could never be effected in any other way, between *Power* and *Liberty*. Liberty in ancient times was wild, turbulent, blood-stained, short-lived, because she was weak. In modern times, and in this country, she is discreet, temperate, humane, healthy, because she is strong. She was weak in ancient times and is at this time weak in Europe because she dwells in *city-states*, or in small rural republics administered on the principle of the *market-democracy*. She is strong in this country, because by the aid of the Representative Principle, in its double application to the Union and the States, she has been able to comprehend a vast continent under the same democratic system, and thus consolidate a purely popular power, which the mightiest monarchies of Europe have found by experience that it were not safe to trifle with.

When, therefore, our author inquires why, if representation be a mere substitute for pure democracy, we do not at once reject the former, and split up into city-states,—we might answer, if it were worth the while to treat such a question seriously,—that representation is not only a substitute for pure democracy but a great improvement upon it. We might answer, that *city-states* do not and cannot possess either the *security* or the *stability* which are essential to political prosperity, and which can only be enjoyed in large communities. Why is it, we might ask in turn, that our author, a native Prussian, is now reposing in peace under the broad banner of the United States of America? Is it not because our fathers, by employing the Representative in connexion with the democratic principle, were able to embody the latter in a community *powerful* enough to protect him against the bloodhounds of despotism, which have hunted him like a partridge upon the mountains, through the whole of Europe, and would follow him across the Atlantic if

they dared? Why did his countryman, the late lamented Dr. Follen, exchange the market-democracy of Switzerland, that classic land of liberty, for the representative democracy of this country? Read the letter which he addressed to the government of Basil, on his departure. "Because the Republicans of Switzerland, who have protected so many fugitive princes, noblemen, and priests, would not protect him, a republican like themselves, he is compelled to take refuge in the *great asylum of liberty*, the United States of America." The letter is, however, hardly just to Switzerland. She *would* willingly enough have protected her republican guest, if she had had the power. Her weakness, and not her will, consented to his departure. If then we do not in this country "split up into city-states" again, it is for this, among many other good reasons, that we may have the *Power* to protect our author and other foreigners, who honor us with their presence, against the diplomatic votes of their Excellencies, the ministers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and Spain, who, if our refugees were living in a *city-state* or a *market-democracy*, would very soon get possession of them, in spite of all their learned citations from Wicquefort, Puffendorf, and Grotius.

It is time, however, to close this article. The work before us, such as we have shown it to be, is nevertheless introduced to the public by a strong recommendation, from no less a personage than Chancellor Kent. The facility, with which individuals, who enjoy the general confidence as men of learning and talent, lend their names to promote the circulation of worthless books, is a great and growing mischief, which ought to be corrected. Another recent and very remarkable instance of it is to be found in the testimony, publicly borne, to the merit of Mr. Otis's translation of the Tusculan Questions of Cicero, by President Quincy, the late William Sullivan, and what we should consider as much higher authority, Mr. Prescott and John Quincy Adams. Why should this be? Is it

not a fraud upon the public to pass a high encomium upon a book of no value, and thus cheat the people out of their money, by inducing them to buy it, or out of their time, by inducing them to read at least a portion of it; which is our own case in regard to the *Tusculans*? Are we at liberty to aid and abet others in doing what we have no right to do for ourselves? Is the moral obligation to be sincere and honest less imperative in the book-selling business than in others? Dr. Warren would think himself dishonored by endorsing a quack medicine. Why should Mr. Adams endorse a quack translation of Cicero; or Chancellor Kent a quack treatise on *Political Ethics*?

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ART. IV. — PURE REASON, — RIGHTS, — DUTY, — FREE-  
WILL.

IN the number of this Review for October last, I offered some reflections on subjects which seemed to me of deep importance. The chief point on which the Editor differed from my views is reserved for a further acquisition of knowledge and maturer thought, and I will only say now, that I then deemed there was a wide difference in the application of the categories of the Pure Reason, as taught by M. Victor Cousin, and the views entertained by myself; at least, I thought my own views more definitely applied. I refer to this portion of that communication, not as affirming more positively my convictions, but that no deductions of any character may be drawn from my silence on the point involved; for so far as I have given it reflection, the decision of my mind remains unaltered.

In that article I undertook to prove, what I shall here assume as established, that the Pure Reason existed from eternity; that there is no period in



the lifetime of the Almighty when we can conceive of all or any abstract Truth existing independently of Him; that truth, of whatever kind, beamed forth intellectually before its material reflexes were created, and before man from the operations of the physical world around him, or the agitations of the more wonderful world of thought within him, deduced their laws and declared *them* Truth. I have sought to establish this proposition, as it is the only one which legitimates to me the belief in a God; that the ideal existed before the material; that the law of formation preceded the formation, and that action is the development of a preëxisting principle.\* Behind and beyond the sensible lies the world of the Pure Reason, and this Pure Reason is a unity, forming in all its wide and sweeping eternity of thought but one harmonious whole, whose boundary is infinitude, and whose presiding spirit is Jehovah. The geologist may bore the earth's centre with his three foot augur, and with his two foot rule measure the illimitable, and with mole eyes and his ounce hammer scale the old rocks which lie at the foundation of the ancient earth, yet in his extinct races and primitive formations he must recognise the activity of a law, forming, shaping, and giving vitality and power as distinctly as that which thrills his feeble pulse, and marks the transition states which he has so laboriously discovered. We are walking if not blindly, yet not altogether in clear vision on this handbreadth of the material, floating in the deep, the profound, the illimitable, where there is other music than of running streams and singing birds and winds and waves and *jabbering* men to worship the sovereign Spirit; we are walking this handbreadth, gazing up at the sun through smoked glasses to proclaim the spots upon his glorious disk, whilst the Infinitude yawns hell-deep beneath, or heaven-wide above us.

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\* The invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, *being understood by the things that are made*, even his eternal power and Godhead. — *St. Paul*.

To have established the fact of the Pure Reason may be something to others ; it has been and is much to me. It is the centre from which all correct thought flows—from the invisible to the visible—from thought to action—from the eternal to the finite and changing—from the Almighty to man and the universe in which man is placed, unfolding all their complexities of relation—of man to God, of man to himself and to others and all which surrounds them. From the contemplation of this Truth are derived the obligations which bind men in society and improve their political and moral condition and make these inseparable. It is the law enforcing Progress, for if truth is eternal man can only discover it, (*he cannot make it,*) and the first feeble perception of it by the first feeble man was but a point in the mighty development, which has required the aggregate of human capacities, linked with the peculiar circumstances in which the history of mankind has been written, to bear us to the point where we now stand ; and in the future opening up before us, undiscovered thought reposes in its eternity. It is the law enforcing progress : it is conservative and destructive ; in the onward movement of society it accepts all truth and destroys all adventitiousness which surrounds it ; and this movement has been ever onward, and nations have been the instruments of its development. There has been no pause, no cessation ; and should the Movement Party in this or any other country abandon fundamental truth, it would then take up the law of retrogression, and its history be written in the blackness of desolation. I cannot refer to any extended examples ; for belonging to the Movement Party, and feeling its impulses, I see no tarrying on the way among the nations of the earth. What if a crown be occasionally trampled in the dust, or a French nation write in blood and tears, that hunger and oppression have no law in human nature to bind the mass to servitude and misery forever ; what if these and more have taken place, have not the physical comforts of life been improved thereby ? and is there not

more freedom of thought and a higher aim given to cultivated intellect? and who will say that upon the crashing and yet smouldering ruins of the French monarchy the Time-Spirit is not brooding over a Phenix-Truth?

If our own progress — and are we not in advance of the institutions of Europe? — was purchased with blood, it was only to carry out the principle of development. Truth was baptized in blood on Calvary. And we have undertaken to show that Christ was the representative of the Pure Reason, and his mission the *nexus* which binds the finite around us to the Infinite above and beyond us; and when others shall show any other than the Christian Movement, which has already produced greater and better results or will produce such, then we will follow him. But a clear case must be made out: the truth and omnipotence of the mission must be shown. To approve its introduction, it must be done as clearly and forcibly as the Christian Movement, which was given to men who could not comprehend the deep significance and broad value of the Truths committed to their care. It must be enforced by the sanctity of a life of unstained purity, and the clearest apperception of those principles, which lie at the foundation of all correct thought and action, eighteen hundred years before those principles are legitimated after the manner of human thought, and established upon correct speculative principles. The life of the Author must be a miracle; such a one as will grow up in poverty and obscurity by the lone seaside with outcast fishermen, yet exhibiting a life of purity such as no man has attained. It must begin in want and lie undeveloped by *education*; and at the period of life when the minds of cultivated men only begin to perceive the truth and beauty of the great system of morals, have perfected his system and completed his mission. When such a master is produced, whose life is a miracle in the control of its own humanity and in development of intellect, of such a character that, at the time of life when others have scarcely

arrived at the mental stature of men, he has finished the labors of a God, then we will follow him ; but till then we must follow Paul, John, and Stephen, even to bonds, stripes, or death.

I have dwelt thus far on this subject because from the Christian Movement we have reached the perception of the Pure Reason, and from the Pure Reason, transmitted through the Christian Movement, we attain to the obligation we are under to do our duty and protect our rights. Our rights ! The ear is pained and the soul is sick of the constant iteration of the word ; and yet all watch-words produce their results. To-morrow and to-morrow the deepening tide will swell onward, until the channels of moral thought be full, and human minds be impelled to human deeds. Let us forward to the battle-field ; the only alternatives are to die gloriously or die meanly ; for in the conflict die we must, and it depends upon ourselves whether we shall be struck down with a proudly heaving breast in the forefront of the battle, or be hung, as cowards deserve to die, for stealing camp furniture, and rifling the dead and dying soldiers' pockets. In plain language, shall we use our god-like qualities for the advancement of mankind, and from the " sweet, sad music of humanity " rise invigorated to its vindication, or shall we use those qualities in concentrated selfishness, and when old age comes with his blear eyes and half-audible sounds, clutching the last dollar that slips through our hands, shall we sink down — down ? Shall we then to the battle-field ? The people have gone forth and will return with the victory. The irrepressible impulse of the human mind has had its direction ; the heavy groundswell of the popular movement has already displaced the landmarks which excluded the masses without the pale of cultivation and progression ; the veil of exclusion is torn down ; the inner wall demolished, and nations are rushing into the Temple of Liberty. Wherever man breathes there is a banner floating in the breeze bearing the inscription of his rights, and martyrs will there be found, in the darkest

abode of the human intellect, wearily, and at the expense of life-blood, working their way upward. And shall we silently fold our arms, and with Sadducean self-gratulation boast of the long list of our own rights, and proclaim that they are not a charter of privileges confining our conduct to a narrow sphere of action, limited by the tyranny of Kings, Lords, and Commons, or extended as may suit their pleasures or their purposes? Shall we not show by an earnest will that human rights are a part and portion of that Divine Intellect, coeval, coexistent, and confluent with the action and manifestation of God?

This has occasioned much glowing eloquence, nor yet in vain; but are there not such things as Duties, which are correlative with Rights? Are not rights the negative, or if the term is better, the privative of duties? If all men discharged their duties, rights would be a term for which there would be no necessity. Rights belong to the accidents of neglect, fraud, and violence; what is improperly withheld from me by another I have a right to demand. Whence does this right arise? From the neglect or wilful forbearance of the discharge of a precedent duty. There can be no rights then until there has been a violation of duties. Rights are only privative; for whence is the origin of human action, and what is the meaning of moral obligations? I am obliged to enforce right against myself, and so are you, and all, and in the universal discharge of duty there will be no rights to be enforced. In the great analysis of development we proceed from the negative and privative to the positive; and in this case we ascended from the perception of the duties of others as they affect us, and are called our rights, to the clear ascertainment and imposition of duty obligatory on all.

Rights were first denominated Privileges in the history of Tyranny, and were the grants of absolute power to favorites; at length privileges were enforced from power, and philosophy legitimated privileges by the perception of Rights, and rights are now insisted upon,



and can be only legitimated by the percèption of Duties. The successful assertion of Rights implies power, violence, coercion over the will of another ; it implies the law of force, disguise it as we may. But the clear perception of duties establishes the direct connexion of the will of the individual with the supreme law of Pure Reason ; and this is the law of our government. Here we reach the last result of investigation in this direction — a fundamental law of our nature. Here is the enforcement of the authority of Reason, and the moral obligation of duty is something else than the privative declaration of our rights. The assertion of duty is the highest appeal. It is the direct reference of the individual to Truth for his justification or condemnation. Exalt the moral qualities and the standard of human conduct from the assertion of individual *rights* to the performance of individual duties, and the baptism of blood and water will become a baptism of the Holy Spirit. As long as we demand rights, the resort is to violence for their enforcement ; but when we insist upon duties, the appeal is to reason, to the kind, the gentle, the persuasive, which God has not so sparingly scattered over “the seed-field of time.” Withdraw the curtain from the past, and let him, who may, rejoice or tremble as he gazes on its solemn deeds. See earth’s thousand battle-fields, and there behold duty contending against the claim of rights ; look back upon that bold, bald peak of time, where the best man drains to its bitter dregs the cup of hemlock, and on his calm brow behold the high resolve of duty against the tyranny of Rights. Look down, where, like a sea of tossing waves, earth’s mighty multitudes sway in dim and horrid outline, and one universal groan of oppression reaches onward even to us standing here, and tell me the language of the oppressed. In the blood of battle-fields, honored and sanctified by their victims, has oppression asserted its rights : — but from the deep abysm of the infinite opening up before us, a new heaven and a new earth are revealed, where every house shall be a temple and

each hearth an altar, and all the sons and daughters of man priests and worshippers, sanctified in the purity of the will enforcing the high discharge of Duty.

The consideration of Duty involves questions of final importance; and in reverence and humility, yet with the fearlessness of upright intention, I approach their discussion, rather with a hope, than with much confidence, that my labors will not be lost. In my former article I approached this subject, in my endeavors to reach a clear apprehension of the Pure Reason, and the existence of the active Personality within us, and the relation of this Personality to the Pure Reason. I have defined what I meant when I spoke of the Pure Reason, but have been misapprehended in my definition of the Personality.\* By this term I mean that portion, power, or principle of our nature which perceives, arranges, combines, reflects, wills; all that which has heretofore been ascribed to mere active intellectuality, and that these are only modified acts of the Personality. Perception is an act of the Personality; sensations may occur and the percipient agent not perceive, as in the case of the clock striking unobserved; sensation may command the attention of the percipient agent, but the percipience becomes immediate action of the Personality; perception is not the operation of sensation upon the mind, but it is the operation of the mind upon the sensation; hence the impossibility of conceiving an agent, (not an instrument,) that is not percipient, or a percipient being, that has no volition. To the degree of percipience with which animal creation is endowed does volition extend. In somnambulism, dreams, revery, mental alienation, there is volition, and it is not a legitimate sequence, that because the act intended does not follow that there has been no volition; nor, again, does the inference follow, that if perception is personality we should be able to perceive whatever we will, and

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\* I have selected the term "Personality" because it conveys to my mind the simple idea of a personal unit — that principle of our nature which constitutes our personal identity.

precisely as we will, for were our will absolute, supreme, this might be the case, and is the case with the Supreme Will within the proper laws of its action. Percipience, reflection, arrangement, combination, volition are, what I understand by the term, accidents of the Personality. This personality may be complete in itself, its internal action may be perfect of its kind, and the communication of that action to the external world be cut off; a paralysis of the tongue may prevent us from speaking,—of the limbs from walking, and yet the volition to do both may be active and be exercised, but fail in the visible demonstration. In dreams, the act does not follow the volition, and yet every one is conscious of exercising acts of volition. All voluntary action is the result of volition, more or less modified; and in mental alienation the victim acts from the clear perception of some fixed idea, which in his case occupies the mind to the exclusion of other perceptions; as the mind may be so engaged, that the striking of the clock is unobserved. Personality is the active principle in man; it is all that portion of our minds not included in the Pure Reason. This presides as it were above and beyond our Personality, but in our creation the latter is adapted to the perception of the former to a greater or less extent, and to the material world which surrounds us; when we reflect, it is the Personality taking cognizance of the Pure Reason or relations of sensations to each other or to the Pure Reason; when it declares an act of judgment, the same mental processes have taken place. There are no other elements of thought, and it is upon the varied combinations of sensations derived from the material world, and the apperceptions of the world of Pure Reason, and the relation of these, that the Personality acts and produces the phenomena of arrangement, combination, reflection, judgment, volition; nor is this latter different from the former; they are all mental processes, and the latter only manifesting itself in conduct. The Personality, as I have often

repeated, is the active power, nor know we of any other active power of the mind. When this active principle has directed its whole energy to the attention of any information (sensation) brought by one of the senses; a sensation brought by another sense may be, and is frequently, unnoticed. Would this be the case were not the Personality a single and simple power? Were it not single and simple it could attend to divers sensations and mental operations at one and the same time; but this is well settled otherwise, that but one idea, or one sensation in a given moment, can occupy the attention of the mind. When Personality directs its attention to purely material substances, and compares them, it must first examine the properties of one, then the other, and declare the difference between the sensations which it perceives. Here is this power taking cognizance of material forms, and this is its action in all that relates to the finite; when it compares abstract ideas, it takes cognizance of its own apperceptions, places them in opposition, or juxtaposition, and declares the mental result, and the same process is passed through in any reasoning connecting the material world with the Pure Reason. When *it* combines ideas,—these must be ideas derived from the material world, from the Pure Reason, or the relation of these to each other; the Personality then can only act on these, and its activity can only be directed to their perception, arrangement, combination, and overt action, as this power shall determine upon the premises. In repetition I would add, that the mind can only entertain one *unit* at a time; that it cannot separate its *supposed* powers and divert their energies to several subjects at once; for if there are separate and distinct powers, then separate and distinct action can be predicated of them at one and the same time. The cognitive faculty is only a phase of the Personality, and those operations of the mind, which we have called by different names in our metaphysical vocabularies, are only the action of this personality forming different combinations from

the elements of reasoning, from the three sources of ideas heretofore alluded to, namely, from the material world of which we are a part and all which surrounds us, the Pure Reason, and their varied relations. This Personality is the responsible portion of our nature, and is distinct from the material world and the Pure Reason, both of which are only elements from which it forms its character and shapes its action. It is different from the material, for knowledge derived from sensations are only instruments, or rather the passive *materiel* in the arrangements and combinations made by the Personality; and its distinction (beside the foregoing which is equally applicable to the latter) from the Pure Reason, is almost palpable; the latter has existed forever,—the action, the volition of the former, commenced with our existence: Truth is from eternity, man the percipient being from yesterday.

Here, then, is the personality or principle of Free-will. Fate, Free-will, Foreknowledge, and Necessity! Here we are amongst the shoals and quicksands; but is there not much in the hidden meaning of these hieroglyphics, which is the result of a misapprehension of the terms used, or a want of definite terms, and also a clear statement of the object to which investigation should be directed? Positive, absolute liberty, in the unlicensed extent of the term is not, either in man, or God. That Being who possesses omniscience and omnipotence has his own law, which is Truth, and he is truth, and beyond this has no liberty. But man is created for a lower sphere of action; he is placed in a world where he is surrounded with physical evils; his lifetime is a war with these; in the deep infinite he dimly perceives the laws of that pure reason which circumscribes the action of the highest; in the world around him, and in the burning desires of his own corporeal frame, he feels the wants of his physical nature;—positive liberty, then, cannot be predicated of such a being; the Infinite is above and the finite is within and around him; his position is relative—relative to the Pure Reason and his physi-



cal condition; and precisely as he approaches the purity of the abstract Truth he approximates to the character and liberty of the Eternal One. "He is a freeman whom the Truth makes free" is of deep significance. In his creation man has been constituted for the apperception of a portion of the Pure Reason above him; with capacity to know and feel that it is above him, and that his physical character is not the highest of his attributes, and that the rule of his conduct is not to be derived from the changeful circumstances of time; but from this Truth, which, so far as each can discover it, he must perceive to be universal and immutable. The law of his nature, then, is to comprehend the Pure Reason to the extent to which the capacity has been given him, and to approximate in his conduct to the rule of its uniformity. The Personality then, having comprehended the Pure Reason, uses it for the control of those desires, passions, and frailties, which spring up in the soil of our physical nature, and curbs them to their legitimate uses. Virtue then has a practical existence, and is the conformity of the Personality, thus made the responsible portion of our nature, to the purity of the universal Truth; and man has to a greater or less extent the capacity to perceive this truth, and to sacrifice his physical desires and propensities to the attainment of this conformity; and were it possible, in this probationary state, to reach the perfect apperception of truth, and conformity of conduct thereto, he would be himself, "the exulting spirit free." \*

But the Personality varies in each individual, and precisely as it varies, the clear vision of the higher truths and conformity of conduct thereto also varies;

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\* Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my words, then are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, *and the truth shall make you free.* They answered him, We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man; how sayst thou, Ye shall be made free? Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, *whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.*

and as he rises to the contemplation of the truths of the Pure Reason, will the certainty and precision of his conduct be manifested ; for its principles are universal and immutable ; but as he ceases to contemplate Truth, and seeks gratification in his appetites, desires, and passions, his conduct becomes uncertain, changing, and shifting, with the relative positions of surrounding circumstances,—of the earth, earthy. In these phenomena of mind it strikes me clearly, that the Personality uses its apperceptions of the Pure Reason for the control of its Humanity, its desires, propensities, &c. ; or if it does not reach this elevated point, it uses the passions and propensities, &c., for physical gratification. Hence, the deduction is irresistible ; the Personality is not governed by motive, but it uses motives as its own instruments for the accomplishment of the purposes pointed out by its own intelligence. Let each of my readers supply himself with examples from history or his own knowledge, where the Personality has endured and controlled physical suffering, and sustained itself even amidst the desolation of the mortal frame, with its “mind’s eye” fixed upward on undying Truth.

All philosophizing is false, which is not capable of a practical application to the wants and actions of man, and futile, if not applied ; and the foregoing considerations now lead us back to our point of departure, and we must accept Personality, as a fundamental law of our nature. It is distinct and separable from the Pure Reason. It is to a greater or less extent the inheritance of all, and constitutes the vital principle of Freedom. It enforces the right to freedom, and imposes the duty on all to attain the *highest liberty*,—the freedom of the spirit. Man is essentially free, and it is upon this principle that all laws are based, and all punishments inflicted. The exercise of the Personality is an essential ingredient in all responsible action. This principle is avowed in the structure of all languages, and all law and character is predicated upon its assumption ; in all criminal legis-

lation is asserted the power, the capacity of the individual to do or not to do, and he is punished or let go free, as this power or capacity has or has not been exercised in its essential freedom. In every punishment which is inflicted, in every contract which is enforced or declared void, the principle is distinctly admitted, that the parties had the capacity to act or not to act, and the consequences attach not to the act itself, but to the volition which produced the act. Apply this principle to moral and political conduct, and it enforces the obligation upon every human being to act for himself, as he will be condemned or acquitted by his own Personality, comparing his acts with its apperceptions of the Pure Reason. The proposition is one of consciousness, and he cannot escape from its influence, and he is compelled in all he says or does, to exercise this capacity; he is compelled by the law of his nature to exercise this spiritual liberty.

Here is the principle of UNIVERSAL FREEDOM; here is the foundation of civil and political liberty; here is the legitimation of our manhood; and every human being on the broad surface of the world has this slumbering energy lying folded within his brain, and to unfold and bring it into proper action, *is the duty of all*, and the instinctive object of religion and legislation. It is not only the right of the individual to be free, but it is his duty to make himself free; if he is in bonds, to burst those bonds asunder; if he is in the dark thralldom of ignorance or vice, to come forth to the sweet and cheerful light of that knowledge which is the highest liberty. Let man hereafter toil with the consciousness of a two-fold power, that his own rights are to be vindicated and corresponding duties exacted to the restitution of those rights.\* And as each

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\* I must give my own views of the operation of the foregoing principles upon the subject of our slavery. I am no slave owner, and the mere political abolitionist I look upon as the despicable *slave* of his own passions and interests. The appeal is to the slave owner for the performance of his highest duty. And what is this? To manumit the ignorant, degraded slave, and turn him upon a community,

values the purity of his own responsible Personality, he must insist upon his rights; for without these, he cannot discharge his duties.—Let each one carry these principles to their consequences, lead where they may,—they are from above, and cannot lead downwards; their application is wide as the wants, and as comprehensive as the holiest hopes of impassioned Beneficence. The application of these principles are momentous. A dim perception of their truth has carried us far onward in the proudest career of national and individual development, and already their influence is setting in, like a gulf-stream of fire, beneath the thrones and oligarchies of the old continents,—they are spreading their influence from their centre to the wide circumference of human thought.

Man is a responsible agent, and no social or factitious line of distinction shall separate him from the rights and duties imposed upon him as a man. Rights and

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where his ignorance and degradation must be continued until the moral feeling, which would at length have prepared him for freedom and brought him manumission, has advanced to that point which would induce us to admit him to all the rights of *our* equality. The slave owner is bound to the discharge of a high and solemn duty. Every man is bound to do the greatest amount of good he can; first by the law of natural feeling and general duty to educate his children, and prepare them for civil and political duties: when this duty is discharged those who are under his immediate control, who, as his tender children, are instruments in his hands for much future good or ill, require his careful training. As a question of moral duty I contend that the master violates his sacred obligations by turning forth his slaves upon the world, uneducated, unprovided with the means of making a living, and in turn discharging their duty. In manumitting the slave only half his debt is paid, and the conscientious master, who does so, easily acquits himself from the more onerous and responsible duty of preparing them for that Freedom. What are the rights of the slave and duty of the master? The incapable man has no right to fill a station the offices of which he is unfitted to discharge, and it is the duty, the highest duty devolving upon the master, to prepare his slave for the discharge of the highest moral duties which may be attained by the cultivated intellect of the slave. The appeal is to the conscience—to the clear apprehension of moral duty, not that the slave shall be liberated, but that he shall be prepared for liberty. I am aware of the practical abuse which may be made of this view of the argument, but he who does so must answer *for the blood upon his conscience.*

duty are correlative and coextensive with this principle of vital Freedom, and urge man onward and upward. Day after day, and century after century, he has been working his way from the complexities of the finite, his sensual character and the force of circumstance, to the Infinite — to the embodiment in his own conduct of the principles of the Truth. Man has ever been and now is approaching in his actions the purity of abstract principles, and will soon learn that whatever immunities he may enjoy, belong equally to the masses; whatever rights he arrogates to himself, he must grant to others; whatever duty is imposed upon him, is incumbent upon all; one equal law defines all rights, and prescribes every duty, and these can only vary in degree, not in character or essence, as we have capacity for the assertion of the one, and the discharge of the other. The future is not altogether dim and clouded, — streakings of a fresh and balmy morning are beaming on the mountain tops, — even now, the gorgeous heraldry of the morn gives promise of the day, and when the full dawn comes, we shall perceive that we are only rapid and transient travellers across a narrow isthmus, separating the eternal past from the illimitable future. And as the dawn becomes still clearer, we shall recognise for men and brethren those, who in the prevailing darkness we apprehended were fiends [*feind*, enemy,]; then in the clear light and cheerful warmth of that day, will each one throw aside the disguises assumed for the journey, and the imposing habiliments which commanded undue reverence, or inspired undue terror, and soften down the stern voice of command which spread dismay around in the incumbent darkness; yes, as the dawn clears up and only friends and brothers are seen, then will they pitch their tents together, and travel kindly on, and at length learn to lie tenderly folded in mutual embrace, as they soon must become fellow passengers across the great ocean which lies before them. So mote it be.

*Wheeling, Va., 1840.*

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ART. V. — *Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States: being a Series of Letters on North America.* By MICHAEL CHEVALIER. Translated from the third Paris edition. Boston: Weeks, Jordan, & Co. 1839. 8vo. pp. 467.

WE are glad that this work has been translated, and placed within the reach of the American reader; and also to find that the translator has executed his task with fidelity to his author, and great credit to himself as an accomplished scholar. The work itself is highly important and interesting, and is well worth the perusal and even the study of every American citizen.

Mr. Chevalier's chief merits as a traveller consist in the fact, that he directs his attention to the most important concerns and interests of the people, among whom he travels. He has a profound sense of the worth of Humanity, and he values manners, politics, institutions, only as they bear on its progress. He clearly perceives that industry must hold the chief rank among the material interests of mankind, and consequently he bestows, as he ought, the greater part of his attention upon the state of industry and the industrious classes. We wish every traveller would do the same, not in our own country only, but in every other. By so doing the materials might at length be collected for a real history of mankind. Hitherto we have had merely the history of the palace, of courts and camps, while scarcely a glance has been bestowed on the industrial masses of our brethren, without whom the palace, courts, and camps would soon cease to be.

In reading this book, it will be well to remember, that it was written to bear upon the writer's own country, not upon ours. Mr. Chevalier makes America, and American society, manners, and institutions merely the text from which to discourse to his own countrymen. His book can therefore afford us but a slight

clue to what he would judge best for us ; it merely tells us what he thinks is best for France. He writes in America and about America, but France is all the time in his heart and in his mind. This fact should induce us to read him with some caution, and to be not too ready to adopt his dicta as law.

Mr. Chevalier appears from his book to have associated, while here, mainly with that portion of our community, which has the greatest distrust of democratic institutions, and manifests the most violent opposition to every democratic administration; and we regret to be obliged to add, that he has, in but too many instances, regarded the complaints of this anti-American party as worthy of consideration, and their statements as deserving of credit. Had he known this party as well as we do, he might have enjoyed their murmurs, but he would hardly have thought it worth his while to detail their opinions, or to record their predictions. The first thing a traveller should do on visiting any country, where parties exist, is to find out which party represents the future of the country visited. Having found out this party, he will do well to study it, and its tendencies; for by so doing he may come to understand the country itself, and to foresee its destiny. But the party of the past is rarely worthy of his study, except so far as a knowledge of it enables him to comprehend the better the party of the future. Mr. Chevalier, unfortunately for him and for the real value of his book, associated while here principally with the party of the past, and has to a great extent given for the actual sentiment of the country, what is merely the sentiment of those who have a secret consciousness, that the sceptre has departed from their hands, and that their forces are nearly all routed and thrown *hors du combat*.

Still we are by no means surprised at this. Mr. Chevalier had, just before sailing for this country, given in his adhesion to the present order of things in France. The reigning order of things in France,

allowance made for the differences of the two countries, is precisely the order of things which has become superannuated here, and which is represented by our party of the past. In France the old feudal nobility is broken down, and nobility founded on birth has lost its power; the three estates have pretty much disappeared, and the Third Estate has in fact become the nation. Louis Philippe is called the citizen-king, and not improperly, when we use the term to designate the fact, that he represents the power of the Commons, or is chief of the Commons, instead of being the chief of the Noblesse.

But the Third Estate, as distinguished from the Nobility and Clergy, is properly the industrial class. Its great interest is industry, commerce, manufactures, agriculture, and the mechanic arts. Of course, then, where this class is the ruling class, industry is the ruling interest. This interest is the interest which must rule in France, if the present order of things is to remain. This Mr. Chevalier very clearly perceives, and hence to the advancement of this interest would he direct the attention of his countrymen, and their government. So far all is well. It is a great step in the progress of Humanity, that of replacing the old society organized for war and conquest, by a society organized for the labors of industry, — replacing the old military society by an industrial society.

But this industrial society is divided into proprietors and operatives, burghers and proletaries. Now in France the means of benefiting the second division are supposed to be the liberal encouragement of the first. The duty of government is thought to be to afford facilities to capitalists for the safe and profitable investment of capital, which will enable them to afford constant employment and good wages to the operatives. Or in other words, government must take care of the rich, so that the rich can take care of the poor. We are not sufficiently acquainted with the actual condition of things in France, to determine

whether this be true policy there or not ; but there is a stage in the progress of modern society in all European countries, when this policy is unquestionably the true one. It is a great gain to Humanity, when the government seeks the interests of industry, though it be by its largesses to capitalists, instead of directing all its measures to the benefit of the aristocratic society, that is, the church and nobility.

But this stage is passed with us, or more properly never belonged to our civilization. The great error in our whole legislation has arisen from confounding our society with European, and adopting European maxims where they could have no proper application. When our legislation has been original, it has been unexceptionable ; but in almost all cases mischievous, when it has been imitative. The distinctions of the old world do not belong to American Society ; and so different in constitution are the two societies, that measures, which in Europe would tend to break down artificial distinctions, here necessarily tend to create them. The only aristocracy, which can amount to anything in this country, must be an aristocracy based on wealth. To an aristocracy of this kind we are not a little exposed. Consequently all measures of government, designed to afford increased facilities to the rich for the profitable investment of capital, necessarily increase the danger ; whereas in societies already aristocratic, in the European sense of the word, such measures tend to break down or neutralize the old aristocracy. There the constitution of society secures to one class important privileges, which even wealth cannot purchase. It is of more importance there to be well-born than to be rich. Consequently wealth needs encouragement, protection, to enable the capitalist to compete with the noble. But here there is no noble. The capitalist is at the top of our society. To legislate especially for him is, then, to legislate especially for an already privileged class.

This is not all. In France, for instance, the opera-

tives suffer for the want of steady employment. Their condition would be undoubtedly much ameliorated, could they find constant employment and regular pay. But here constant employment and regular pay, even high wages, would be but very little if any amelioration of the condition of our operatives. There it is well so to organize industry, as to enable the possessors of the funds of production to employ as many workmen as possible. But here such an organization of industry would be no advance on our present condition, but in fact a retrogression. Here, so far as government meddles with the matter at all, it should aim to increase the facilities, by which operatives may become also proprietors.

Miss Martineau, and most liberal foreigners, who travel among us, seem to overlook the fact, to which we have here sought to draw attention. Miss Martineau's beau ideal of society is a manufacturing society, in which the distinction between proprietor and operative is as strongly marked, as the distinction ever was between a patrician and a plebeian, a seignior and his vassal, or the landlord and his serf or villein. What we want is not employment for workmen, but the diminution, in the greatest possible degree, of the number of mere workmen seeking employment. Everywhere the workman at wages is a sort of slave, more or less at the mercy of his employer. The capitalist invests his capital not for the purpose of obtaining the means of subsistence, but the increase of his wealth. For this end he purchases labor. But the workman sells his labor that he may obtain not wealth, but the means of subsistence. Now as the urgency to obtain the means of subsistence must always be greater than the urgency to grow richer, the laborer must always be more desirous of selling his labor than the capitalist can be of purchasing it. Hence the purchaser is in a condition to exert more influence on the terms of the sale and purchase than can be exerted by the seller. He has as much more power over the laborer than the laborer has over him,



as the urgency to get something to eat is greater than the urgency to grow richer. How much this is may be inferred from the fact, that long ago one Esau, to obtain a mess of pottage to save himself from immediate starvation, resigned to his brother his right, as the eldest born, to the inheritance and patriarchal authority of his father. Now, as it is the mission of this country to make every man free and independent, the true American party is constantly laboring to amalgamate the operative with the employer, to abolish the whole class of proletaries, as the opponents of slavery would abolish the class of slaves.

But the party with us opposed to the Federal administration, as it has been under General Jackson and his successor, have perceived nothing of all this. They have contemplated no further amelioration of the workingmen, than would result from increased facilities secured by government to business men for the profitable investment of the funds of production. This party, then, as it regards industry, adopt the doctrines which belong not to our own country, but to the present order of things in France, and we may add also in England. Here, if we mistake not, is the secret of Mr. Chevalier's partiality for American Whigs. He is a believer in the progress of the race, and would labor effectually for it; he sees, or thinks he sees, what would be a progress in his own country, and that is all with which he concerns himself. The policy advocated by American Whigs is virtually the policy he would recommend to France, as better adapted to its actual condition than the policy contended for by American democrats; he accordingly advocates it without troubling himself to inquire very carefully which policy is best for us.

Mr. Chevalier was here during the period, when the question of the United States Bank was so warmly debated both in Congress and throughout the country. He took sides with the Bank, and no small part of the volume before us is either an account of the progress of the debate, or a statement of reasons why the Bank

should be sustained. He labors hard to prove that the Bank is essential to the industry of the country, and cannot and will not be dispensed with. In ordinary cases, we should listen to a liberal and enlightened foreigner on so important a question, with some deference; but in the present case we cannot regard Mr. Chevalier's opinions as entitled to much weight. He has no very clear conception of the nature of our institutions. He does not seem to be sufficiently aware, that, so far as industry among us is to be organized, that is, regulated by institutions, it must be done by the State governments, and not by the Federal government. The Federal government has in reality jurisdiction only over what concerns the several States in their external relations, either with foreigners or with one another. It was never designed to have an immediate bearing on the interests and affairs of the individual citizen. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and between the States. This power of regulating commerce between the States was given to Congress, so as to secure uniformity throughout the Union, and to prevent one State from imposing restrictions on trade or business operations with citizens of another State. The right to coin money, and regulate its value, as well as to establish a uniform system of weights and measures, was vested in the Federal government; but evidently for the purpose not of acting on the private interest of citizens, but for facilitating the business intercourse of the citizens of one State with those of another. Admitting, then, that the influence of the Bank on the industry of the country would be as salutary as Mr. Chevalier supposes, we could not institute it without departing widely from the spirit of our institutions.

Then, again, the institution of a National Bank would be attended by great political dangers. Mr. Chevalier is a centralizationist. He has no conception of a federal government, and, therefore, does not see the danger of making the General Government

with us too strong. With us, the danger will always be not of weakening the Federal government, but of strengthening it too much. This danger arises partly from its central position, and from its actual supremacy in certain cases over the State governments, from which careless reasoners easily infer its supremacy in all cases. Now the power of a national bank must be great. If not, the bank is good for nothing. If it be, then its establishment, if it agree with the government which creates it, as will be ordinarily the case, will add so much to the power of the Federal government, already so great, as to threaten the very existence of the States.

If we establish a United States Bank, in order to have it worth anything, we must give it sufficient power to regulate the currency of the country, that is, to control all our banking operations. With less power than this, it could not maintain throughout the Union a sound and uniform currency. By its control then of the whole banking system of the country, it would control all the industrial operations of our citizens. If it in turn is to be controlled by the Federal government, the Federal government must become the only efficient government of the country. Its power through the medium of the Bank would be felt in every bargain that was made, and would affect the price of every article bought or sold. Is there no danger in giving to the Federal government a power so unlimited?

But suppose the government does not control the Bank; suppose the government and the Bank disagree; what is the result? Why, then we must have the government on the one side, representing the political interests of the country; and the Bank, representing its business operations on the other. The government and Bank will be at war, the whole country convulsed, industry to a great extent paralyzed, and we must have bankruptcy, financial distress, and ruin, till either the government or the Bank succumb. This is precisely what we have experienced during

the last ten years. If we have a National Bank, we must either have this result or the other.

Moreover, the Federal government is a government of limited powers. It is properly the agent of the States. The Constitution is its power of attorney; and it has no right to go beyond its letter of instructions. In this letter of instructions there happens to be no clause granting to Congress the right to charter corporations. Strictly speaking, therefore, a Bank incorporated by Congress would have no legal existence. The law creating it would be a nullity, and it would only require a faithful performance of duty on the part of the Courts, to render it wholly inoperative.

But aside from these considerations, there is another reason why we are not disposed to place much dependence on Mr. Chevalier's opinions in favor of a United States Bank. These opinions resulted naturally from a system he brought with him, or to which he was previously committed. Mr. Chevalier belonged to the politico-religious sect, which sprung up some few years ago in France, called Saint-Simonians. He had been one of their missionaries, and one of their most active members. True, he left the sect after its two chiefs, Bazard and L'Enfantin, quarrelled and separated; but we do not find that he has ever abandoned their doctrines. This book is full of doctrines which he learned in their school, and we are satisfied that he was virtually a Saint-Simonian when he wrote it.

As our readers may not be very familiar with the views of the Saint-Simonians, we must be allowed to give a short account of them. The Saint-Simonians are so called from Saint-Simon, a descendant of the famous Duc de Saint-Simon, and, through the Counts of Vermandois, of Charlemagne. He early entered the French service, and distinguished himself at the siege of Yorktown in this country, where he held an important command under Bouillé. He returned to France about the time of the breaking out of the

French Revolution, in which, however, he seems to have taken little part. For a while he was engaged in some extensive banking speculations, by means of which he amassed a considerable property, the greater part of which he subsequently lost in an attempt to found a grand scientific and industrial school or academy, which ultimately failed. After the failure of this establishment, he devoted several years and the wrecks of his fortune to making himself acquainted with the actual state of European sciences and art, with the actual progress of ideas, and the means of stimulating their further progress. He travelled through several European countries, and published or wrote several scientific works. In 1814 he began to apply himself to the improvement of the industrial classes, and in 1824 or 1825 he assumed the character of a prophet, and published the first part of a work, entitled "New Christianity," soon after which he died in a state of absolute poverty and want. He appears to have been an extraordinary man, a profound thinker, and an enthusiastic friend of his race.

His followers soon after his death formed themselves into an association, and began, in a weekly paper called *Le Producteur*, to publish the doctrines he had taught them. In 1828 and 1829 great numbers had joined them, and Bazard and L'Enfantin gave a masterly exhibition of their principles in one of the most extraordinary works ever published, entitled *Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première Année. 1828 et 1829*, which was followed the next year by a still further *Exposition*. After the Revolution of 1830, they assumed considerable political importance, and, in 1831 and 1832, threatened to become predominant throughout all France. The *Revue Encyclopédique*, one of the ablest periodicals ever published in France, became devoted to their views; and they obtained possession of *Le Globe*, of which they circulated gratuitously more than five thousand copies daily. Their Missionaries penetrated France in all directions, and labored with a zeal and



self-devotion rarely ever surpassed. But some disputes occurring about the principles of a provisional organization of the Saint-Simonian Society, which had become necessary, led to a quarrel, to a division, and finally to complete dissolution.

Of the philosophical, political, and religious doctrines, many of which may be found incorporated into our own writings, we have now neither the space nor the leisure to speak. The peculiarity of the sect, which most concerns us at present, is its proposed organization of society. It adopts the hierarchical form of government, and terms its chiefs, priests or fathers. Mankind are divided into three classes, according to their three-fold nature. Man is a being that *knows, loves, and acts*. Those in whom the principle of intelligence predominates constitute a class, called *Savans*, or the scientific; those in whom the principle of activity is predominant constitute another class, termed the *Industriels*; in fine, those in whom love is predominant constitute the third and highest class, termed *Artists*. Each of these classes has its chiefs or priests, and over all is a supreme chief or pope, PERE SUPREME, a dignity for a time possessed conjointly by Bazard and L'Enfantin.

The sexes are held to be equal, and the complete man includes both man and woman. When the Saint-Simonian Society is definitively organized, there will be at its head a supreme Father and a supreme Mother. The supreme Father they had found, but among the fair daughters of France there could nowhere be discovered one worthy to be the suprême Mother. The Saint-Simonian Society therefore could not be definitively organized: for though a man they could find, yet a woman, not one. But it was necessary meanwhile to have some organization. A proposition to this effect was therefore made. It was proposed to call upon the believers to organize themselves provisionally; and here commenced the fatal quarrel. Bazard was a man of this world, a distinguished liberal, acting with the liberal political party throughout France,

and disposed to make the Saint-Simonian movement subsidiary to the political movement he countenanced. L'Enfantin was more of a philosopher and theologian, and dwelt more in the region of ideas than in that of material interests. Bazard looked at the Saint-Simonian movement in its relations to the actually existing order of things, and wished to avoid, as much as possible, the exciting of prejudices against it in the minds of the republican party, who were not disposed to be Saint-Simonians; L'Enfantin viewed it only in relation to systematic consistency, and studied only to conform to truth, without regard to expediency or convenience. When the question came up, on what principles the provisional organization should be made, Bazard contended that, although the organization to be adopted could not be regarded as final, yet it should be expressly stated that no organization could be contemplated by true Saint-Simonians, which should not hold sacred the marriage covenant, as understood in actually existing society. This L'Enfantin opposes, on the ground that until the supreme mother is found, and woman is represented, it is obviously improper and unjust to legislate on the relations of the sexes to each other. In this a strong party went with him. Another portion adhered to Bazard, and thus the debate opened. Bazard accused L'Enfantin of advocating the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes. This L'Enfantin denied. Man had established the present relations between the sexes, and that might be a presumption that they were not perfect. But these relations concerned woman as well as man, and she from her sensibility and innate modesty was even better qualified to legislate on them than he was; no law then should be passed concerning them until woman should be represented, and have an opportunity to let her voice be heard. But the debate waxed warmer and warmer, until some renounced Saint-Simonianism altogether; and it ended finally in a complete separation between the two chiefs and their respective adherents. Bazard soon after killed

himself, and his party broke to pieces. L'Enfantin continued a while, but unchecked by the worldly wisdom and the practical sense of Bazard, his party became extravagant, and their meetings were suppressed by the government. L'Enfantin, the last we heard of him, was in the employment of the Pacha of Egypt, as an Engineer.

We have thus spoken briefly of the general organization of Society proposed by the Saint-Simonians. What more immediately concerns us now is their doctrine on the organization of property. They recognise the right of property, but protest against the usual law of its descent. In a word they deny its hereditary descent. According to them property should be inherited not as now according the order of birth, but according to the order of capacity.

They call all property funds of production. These funds are to be organized by means of Banks, and are to be distributed to the members of society according to their several capacities.

In order to understand this, it is necessary to enter into some details. The Saint-Simonians propose to educate all children, both male and female, at the public expense. Education is first general and then special. General Education is the education bestowed upon all alike, up to a certain age, till individual tendencies become *prononcées*. Then special education begins. The children are divided then into three classes; that is, according to their aptitudes, into *Industriels*, *Savans*, and *Artistes*. They are subdivided again on the same principle into as many classes as there are particular branches of industry, science, and art. Each class and each individual in the class is instructed and trained for the pursuit chosen, till the individual is qualified to engage in it of himself. Then he leaves school, and receives from the Bank the funds necessary for his calling.

There must be a grand Central Bank, with branches for each department, and sub-branches for each parish or commune. The individual, say a blacksmith, has just

left school, and now proposes to carry on blacksmithing. He wants for this purpose the necessary funds. He applies to his Parish Bank, with a statement of his capacity, and his wants; his application and statement are transmitted to the Departmental branch, and finally to the Central Bank, which ascertains where a blacksmith is wanted, the amount of funds needed in that place for carrying on the business on a profitable scale, or the scale proportioned to the capacity of the individual applicant. All this determined,—information is sent to the Parish Bank, together with an order for the necessary funds on the Bank nearest to the place, where it is determined the young blacksmith shall carry on his business.

Now our friend Chevalier, we apprehend, saw a faint outline of this system of organizing the funds of production, in the United States Bank and its Branches. This perhaps will account for his partiality to the Bank, and for what he says about the organization of industry, and show the value of his opinion.

For ourselves, though we have found much in the doctrines of the Saint-Simonians to approve, and in their enthusiasm to admire, we are far from relishing their scheme for the organization of society. They go on the ground that the mass of the people must be led, and that all the concerns of human life should be entrusted to a few chiefs, or leaders. If these leaders could be gods, perhaps this would not be amiss; but all experience proves that individuals can rarely possess power over their brethren, without abusing it. The possession of power almost always corrupts, and the man, who while in private life shuddered at the bare mention of certain crimes against his fellows, shall no sooner rise to authority than he shall commit them without remorse. We have had enough of hierarchies in this world, and it is time now to try the experiment of popular government.

The interests of industry we regard as the primary interests of a community, because where these are neglected no others can be successfully prosecuted.

We are not among those who cry out against the industrial and mechanical tendency of our times. Undoubtedly the moral elevation of the people is the end to be sought, but it comes only in the train of physical elevation. Art and science, and the various embellishments of life, are by no means to be underrated; but they are not for those whose sole care is to save themselves from starving. The importance, which the laboring classes have assumed in our days, is owing to the new field, and the greater demand for labor, which the discovery of this Continent and the extension of commerce have opened to it. Labor has thus obtained a wider field and a richer reward, and the laborer, therefore, has become more independent, and had more leisure to attend to the wants of the soul. We have long been of the opinion, that preparatory to that moral elevation of the masses, contended for by our philanthropists and reformers, we must elevate them 'physically, and make their condition in life somewhat easy. We therefore sympathize wholly with Mr. Chevalier in his regard for industry. The encouragement of the industrial activity of a country is by no means an object beneath the notice of the moralist, nor, if he could but see it, of a Transcendentalist.

But we confess, that, so far as we have been able to discover, industry is best encouraged not by being taken under the especial care of authority, but by being left free. The individual is a better judge than government of the proper place to establish himself, and the kind of business it is for his interest to prosecute. All that we want in this country, for the encouragement of industry, is its entire freedom, and a uniform and steady measure of value. Give us these, and our industry will be sufficiently productive, and successfully compete with that of all other nations.

Mr. Chevalier advocates the Bank, because it would constitute a fourth estate in our government, and become the effective government of the country. There can be no doubt that the Bank, organized on the prin-



ciples he contends for, would control the whole industry of the country, and through industry all branches of the government. This he asserts, and this we admit. But what guaranty have we that it would exert this control for the public good? What security can he give us that the Bank would not, in case it became as powerful as he supposes, reduce the great mass of the industrious classes to an abject and hopeless slavery? We grant the Bank would control the industry of the country; but what would control the Bank? It could dictate the measures of government; but what would dictate its measures? Before surrendering to the Banks our right to govern ourselves, it strikes us, that we should have some surety that they will govern in the interests of Humanity. If they are to be as powerful as it is contended they should be, there can be in this country no power to control them. King Snake may be a more efficient ruler of the frogs than king Log; but what shall become of the poor frogs, if he take it into his head to eat them?

We have dwelt so long on this part of Mr. Chevalier's book, that we have no space left to comment on the remainder. But we would say in general terms, that the book, with the exception of its doctrines on banks and the regulation of industry, is in the main liberal, manly, philosophical, and unobjectionable. The author made a good use of his time while here, and acquired no little insight into our national character, and the workings of our institutions. Mistakes he falls into frequently, but never does he intentionally misrepresent us. He everywhere maintains the tone and bearing of an honest, intelligent man, visiting a foreign country to collect the wisdom that may be useful to his own. The American people will reject his Saint-Simonianism; but they will respect him as one who has been disposed to do them justice, and read his work, as containing much valuable information, and some philosophical speculations on the destiny of Humanity, well worth considering.

EDITOR.

ART. VI.—*The School Library.* Published under the Sanction of the Board of Education of the State of Massachusetts. Boston: Marsh, Capen, Lyon, & Webb.

THERE are few projects, which we more heartily approve, and wish success to, than that of furnishing every school district with a library. Few things are more important to the young, than ready access to good books, and the early formation of a taste for reading. It not only prepares them for more usefulness in after life, but opens to them a source of innocent enjoyment, which will save them from many of the vices, to which youth are in general exposed.

Men who have not passed through the schools are said to be uneducated; but no man, who has free access to books, and is a diligent reader of them, can with any justice be said to want education. We should like to know what is learned in the university, which cannot be learned from books? It is rare that your professors can advance on their text-books, or that they know as much of the sciences they undertake to teach as the student may find in his manuals. Whoever knows how to read, and has the proper books within his reach, may attain, for aught we can see, to all the scientific and literary eminence he could, were he to graduate at the first university in the land.

In these times all may be educated who have access to well selected libraries. All the sciences are treated in books, wherein is deposited all that is known of them. All branches of learning have their manuals; and all languages, worth the acquisition, have their grammars and lexicons; and whoever cannot acquire a language,—all except its pronunciation,—by means of grammar and lexicon, is not one whom a living teacher could aid. A library, then, if of the right stamp, is of more importance to the district than the school itself. Our common schools are

by no means what they ought to be, and in the actual state of things effect altogether less for the general intelligence and advancement of the community than is commonly pretended. They are not unfrequently nurseries of vice, where many of the bad habits which accompany us through life are first acquired. The parent often finds the labor of years to form his boy to the love and practice of virtue undone by a six weeks' attendance at one of our common schools. The education, then, which we crave for the children of our commonwealth, cannot be obtained from them. Something in addition to them is wanted ; and this something, it strikes us, may be found, to a great extent, in a well-selected library for each school district.

But this library should be well selected ; and here is the difficulty. Who shall make the selection ? The most natural answer is, the parents and guardians of the children immediately concerned. I choose to select the books my children are to read ; and why not every parent do the same ? But our Board of Education, in the true spirit of whiggism, say, that I must not be allowed to select my child's reading. They distrust the capacity of the inhabitants of the school district to make a judicious selection, and therefore undertake to make the selection for them.

This brings us to some objections we have to the School Library, noticed at the head of this article. We object to it, that it is published under the sanction of the Board of Education. We regard this as an insult officially offered to the inhabitants of the school districts. No doubt, in many cases, the district would make an unwise selection ; but this is an evil inseparable from the present imperfect state of Humanity. The people must work out their own salvation, and acquire wisdom by their own failures. Their progress cannot be effected by the maxim of European princes, which the Board seem to have adopted, "*Every thing for the people ; nothing by the people ;*" but by the American maxim, "*Nothing*

for the people, but everything by the people.” We are far from believing in the infallibility of the people; but we hold that it is better, the people should manage their own concerns, albeit they should sometimes manage them unwisely, than that there should be guardians appointed to manage for them. We must, therefore, frown upon all measures or propositions for taking away the management from the people themselves. I am never a man so long as I am not permitted to think and act for myself. Better that I should sometimes fall and be seriously hurt, than that I should never undertake to walk. What is true of me, as an individual, is true of the people.

Then, we have no surety that a Board of Education will upon the whole make a better selection of books than would be made by the people themselves. We have not yet learned that Boards of Education are infallible. They are composed of individuals who share the weakness as well as the strength of Humanity. Our present Board have indeed officially declared themselves to be “conspicuous for their talents, and to possess in a high degree the confidence of the respective parties and denominations, from which they were severally selected;”<sup>\*</sup> and, although we are no doubt bound to regard this official sanction with great deference, inasmuch as the Board may be supposed to be the best acquainted with their own merits, and, therefore, the best judges, we must still, since men have been known to over-estimate their own talents and virtues, believe that they constitute no exception to the general fallibility of our race. The experiment of managing the public affairs by “the wisest and best,” instead of by the people them-

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<sup>\*</sup> See Introductory Essay, p. ix. This introductory Essay was written by a member of the Board, and as it makes a part of the Library, it must have received the sanction of every member; so it is rightly regarded as an official sanction of the Board by itself. Very modest, we must confess. For the honor of the Board, we trust there was but one member of it that could have written this self-praise, and that the rest permitted it to pass out of courtesy to him.

selves, has been tried for ages, but so far as history may be relied on, with uniform ill success. We see no reason why the experiment should be more likely to succeed with us than elsewhere. The Board is no doubt a learned board, composed of conspicuous individuals, but after all, it may not be the best of all caterers for the intellectual appetites of the community.

Moreover, the Board, we apprehend, exceed their legal functions, when they assume to sanction a School Library. Is there any provision in the law constituting the Board, which authorizes them to assume so important a function? They sanction these books, as a Board, not as individuals. Where is the law authorizing them to prepare and sanction a suitable Library for the school districts?

But passing over this; we object to the selection of the books by a Board, because the Board will select and recommend the same books to all the districts. This may have a tendency to produce a uniformity of opinion, and a dead level of information throughout the commonwealth; but, levellers as we are supposed to be, we much question whether this dead level and uniformity be at all desirable. Variety is as essential as uniformity; and where there is no conflict of opinion, no inequalities of information, there will be no progress. We believe it would be far better to have the libraries variously made up, as they would be if left entirely to the discretion of the districts, than to have them constituted of a uniform series of books, as they must be if selected and sanctioned by the Board. In the one case, some thousands of different books would be read and studied in the commonwealth; in the other case, only one or two hundred. The difference between the two modes is therefore obvious, and decidedly to the disadvantage of the one we are opposing.

We object also to the sanction of the Board, because it is an approach to a censorship of the press. The publishers will not dare insert in their series a



book not sanctioned by the Board, however valuable it may be in itself, or however acceptable it would be to a large number of school districts; and the author will not dare pour out his whole thought, but only such a portion of it as he has reason to believe the Board will not refuse to sanction. Who that writes from his own full heart, and strong convictions, would suffer his book to come out, even if it could, under the sanction of a board of supervisors, as if he were a child and under tutelage? The Board, in presuming to supervise and sanction the publication of any book, sins against the freedom and dignity of letters. An author should deem himself insulted by being asked to write a work, to be published under the sanction of a board of education, or any other board. If he have aught of the spirit that becomes him, he must regard the bookseller that should urge him to such an act of self-degradation, as his worst enemy, and reply to him, "I am a man, and not a child, and have not 'escaped the ferula' to come under the fescue of an imprimatur."

We shall be told that the Board claims no authority, and the districts are at perfect liberty to purchase or not to purchase the books recommended. This is not ingenuous. Do not the respectable publishers, who are sending out the School Library, count the sanction of the Board of some consequence to them as publishers? Would they, in fact, undertake the publication of the Library, if they could not obtain this sanction? Do not the publishers undoubtedly believe, that the sanction of the Board will help the sale of the books, that it will have great influence with the school districts in inducing them to buy the books so sanctioned, rather than any others? This influence the Board is to exert not by the personal weight of its members, as individuals, but as a legal Board, acting officially. School districts will to no small extent imagine, that this series of books Messrs. Marsh, Capen, Lyon, and Webb are putting forth, is selected and published by the authority of the State,

and they will, therefore, feel bound to purchase them. This the Board well knows, otherwise it would not give its sanction ; and this the publishers know, otherwise they would not wish it. Why not, then, own at once, that the Board expects, by an extra-official act, to induce school districts to buy a certain series of books ; and that the publishers seek the sanction of the Board for their own private interest ?

We object, also, to the very project of preparing a series of books expressly for School Libraries, and that, too, whether consisting of selected or of original productions. The selection will, in general, be not of the best books in the language, those which have the most positive merit, but those which have the greatest negative merit, that is, those which are least objectionable. Books of strongly marked character, of decided opinions, must be excluded, because they may come athwart somebody's prejudices, and thus affect the reputation and diminish the sales of the series. The books selected must, therefore, for the most part, be books with which every body is familiar, and which may be found in almost every private library, and, therefore, not needed for the School Library ; or books which have not character enough to excite any opposition. Authors, employed to prepare original works, will be selected on the same principle. Those authors, who are remarkable for bold and manly thought, strong sense, and original ideas, men of decided characters, who are earnest in the defence of what they regard as the truth in politics or religion, can find no favor with Boards of Education. They have substance enough in them to excite opposition, and to create enemies, as well as friends ; and, therefore, are not likely to write books, which will be purchased by men of all opinions, and of no opinions. The authors most likely to be employed are your safe men, prudent men, men who have no ideas with which to alarm the community, pretty writers, who figure in *Souvenirs* and *Foget-me-nots* ; or if any others, they will be required to write on topics on which there is

no difference of opinion in the community, and, therefore, on topics on which more books are not wanted.

This is not all. Whoever knows anything about the production of a book, knows very well, that a genuine book is not an article to be furnished to order as a bale of goods. It must be the sincere production of the author's own mind. He must write it out of his own full heart, for a serious and an honest purpose, and because there is a necessity in his own soul compelling him to write it. There has been at one time and another much talk about patronage, and our literary men sometimes complain of the want of patronage. All this is sheer nonsense. The only patronage an author wants is the green earth, the clear blue sky, and the free air of heaven; the simple freedom to speak out, in his own natural tones, what it is in him to speak. He must choose his own subject, and his own time and method of treating it. He can submit to no laws, but those of his own mind, and no directions, but those of his own judgment. Books, which are written expressly for "Libraries," bear ample testimony, by their feebleness, their inanity, to the truth of these remarks. We have found none among them worth the trifle we are required to pay for them, much less the time, to say nothing of the wear and tear of conscience, necessary to their perusal. The only way to obtain good books is to let men write on such subjects as they please, for the public at large; and the way to make up a library is to select from the mass of books thus produced.

If the School Library is published under the sanction of the Board, school districts will feel themselves under a sort of legal obligation to purchase the books of which it is composed. But, can anybody be so foolish as to suppose, that the "School Library" will contain all, or even a tithe of the books best adapted to the wants of a school district? Is there no likelihood that the Board, through its own ignorance, prejudice, or oversight, will pass over some of the best books which can be put into the hands of the young?

Moreover, is not the publication of such "Libraries," under the sanction of a board, a serious injury to sound and living literature? Such a series of books is likely to have an extensive circulation; authors will, therefore, unless they reflect on the consequences, be desirous of writing books which may be admitted into it. But these books must pass through the ordeal of the board. The author, therefore, will naturally be led to ask not what is true, what books are best for Humanity, but simply, what books will be likely to receive the sanction of the Board. The injurious effect of such an inquiry, and the practice it must generate, are too obvious to need any comments.

The Board profess to adopt, as a rule, that no book of a sectarian character in religion, or of a partisan character in politics, shall be admitted into this series. If they adhere to this rule, we can assure them that their series will be valueless indeed. We should like to have them tell us what views in regard to religion are not sectarian, or what opinions in relation to politics have not a partisan character? If they exclude whatever is sectarian, they must exclude all that relates to religion, for we know no doctrine of religion which some portion of our fellow-citizens do not controvert, and we know no political doctrine which can be maintained, that has not a bearing in favor or against one or the other of the great parties which now divide our political world. For ourselves, we do not wish the rule adhered to; we would have all sects and parties, instead of being excluded from the library, represented in it. We would have the district adopt as a rule, for its government in the selection of books,—that, when a book is introduced, giving one side of a question in religion or politics, the best book that can be found treating the opposite side shall be procured and admitted. This is the only practicable rule to be observed, if the library is to possess any positive value, and the rights of all concerned are to be respected.

We believe the motives which have governed the

Board in setting on foot the present series of publications are praiseworthy, but this does not take away the mischievousness of the principle involved in their proceedings. The devil always appears as an angel of light; that is, in the form of some measure that is really good, which commends itself to the best affections of our hearts, but which is mistimed or misplaced. The genius of our institutions admits of no coercive means for the promotion of moral objects, nor can we force the growth of the virtues. Here, philanthropists cannot aid the progress of the race by associations, and combined action. They may act, but not for the people, nor on the people, but with the people. They must speak, write, and act, as individuals, as equal members of the community, and if they are really wiser and better than the mass, their suggestions will be adopted. At any rate, they can carry on the work of improvement no faster than they can commend themselves to the reason and conscience of the people at large. This is a truth we have frequent occasion to iterate, and reiterate. Our reformers are perpetually prone to forget the country in which they live, and the spirit of the institutions it is their duty to uphold. We are continually adopting maxims proper to an order of things which does not exist with us. Individuals, no doubt, must take the initiative in all reforms, but they must do it not by seeking laws to aid them, nor by establishing associations or combinations to give a factitious weight to their propositions. They must do it simply as men, as part and parcel of the people, and wait always the slow process of intellectual and moral conviction. All reforms must, then, of course, be effected slowly: but by attempting to effect them only by bringing the whole mass of the people to see and feel their desirableness and practicability, we shall always effect them safely and surely.

In passing from the Board to the volumes before us, already published, we have less to find fault with. To the credit of the publishers, the volumes are print-



ed and done up in a neat and attractive form, which we hold to be no small recommendation. In this respect, "The School Library" of Messrs. Marsh, Capen, Lyon, & Webb compares advantageously with a similar series of books put forth by the Messrs. Harper of New York, a series, which, for the slovenly manner in which it is executed, is disgraceful to the house which publishes it, and to every school district which shall purchase it. There is not, so far as we have examined it, a single volume in Messrs. Harper's series, that is even tolerably printed. But the volumes before us are got up with much taste, and are, in respect of dress and appearance, all that we should wish them to be.

We have before us now ten volumes of the principal series. They are all old works, or at least works previously published, and which were already accessible to such school districts as wished them. The first volume is Washington Irving's *Life of Columbus*, abridged by the author. Our objection to this volume is, that it is an abridgment, and that it is published under the *sanction* of the Board of Education. We dislike abridgments, and for a Board of Education to presume to *sanction* one of Washington Irving's works, is a piece of impertinence we cannot easily overlook.

Volumes II. and III. comprise "Paley's Natural Theology, with additions, from Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell, a Life and Portrait of the Author, with numerous other illustrations. The whole newly arranged and adapted to the School Library, by Elisha Bartlett, M. D." Here again is the same impertinence on the part of the Board. On the frontispiece of each volume, we read ;

"This volume is sanctioned by the Board of Education of the State of Massachusetts, as one of the series entitled 'The School Library,' published by Marsh, Capen, Lyon, & Webb.

EDWARD EVERETT,  
GEORGE HULL,  
EMERSON DAVIS,

EDMUND DWIGHT,  
GEORGE PUTNAM,  
ROBERT RANTOUL, Jr.  
THOMAS ROBBINS,  
JARED SPARKS,  
CHARLES HUDSON,  
GEORGE N. BRIGGS."

How much better known to the American people are George Hull, Emerson Davis, Thomas Robbins, George Putnam, Edmund Dwight, Charles Hudson, George N. Briggs, than Paley, Sir Charles Bell, and Lord Brougham? Are our people so ignorant of English Literature, that such a work as this needs the sanction of a Board, all of whom, with a couple of exceptions, are unknown even to our own literature? Where was the modesty of these men; or their respect for the intelligence of the community? As it concerns the work itself here put forth, we have not much to say. The additions, from Lord Brougham and Sir Charles Bell, we have but cursorily examined. The original work of Paley is a most excellent work to circulate, if we wish to make atheists. As a demonstration of the existence of God, it is worse than valueless. It assumes in the outset the very point the atheist wants proved, and consequently its whole reasoning is vitiated.

Volumes IV., V., and VI. are made up of selections from Sparks's Biography of eminent individuals. These, of course, the Board could not refuse to sanction; for Mr. Sparks is a member of it, and his colleagues could not be so discourteous to him as to refuse their sanction to one of his own publications. But saving the imprimatur of the Board, the volumes are worthy of a place in a School Library.

Volumes VII., VIII., IX., and X. are entitled "Sacred Philosophy of the Seasons; illustrating the Perfections of God in the Phenomena of the Year. By the Rev. Henry Duncan, D. D., Ruthwell, Scotland. With important additions and some modifications to adapt it to AMERICAN READERS, by Rev. F. W. P. Green-

wood, D. D." Here the impertinence of the Board is not so great. The whole weight of its authority is necessary to bring this work into notice, and will after all be insufficient, we apprehend, to induce the people to read it. It is a miserable concern, professedly religious, but really skeptical in its philosophy and tendency. Grant me the premises which the author everywhere assumes, and I will demonstrate the absurdity of every religious emotion and belief. How long shall men try to form to themselves a God out of matter? When will they learn that the revelation of God is to the reason, the soul, not to the senses?

But, although we absolve the Board of the sin of impertinence, in sanctioning these volumes, we cannot so easily acquit the American Editor. We know little of Dr. Greenwood; but be he who or what he may, we cannot excuse him for presuming to alter another man's works. In a literary sense we hold it an unpardonable sin to alter, abridge, or mutilate another man's productions. The author has a right to have his works published, if they are published at all, as he himself wrote them, and wished them to go forth to the world, and no man should be allowed the freedom of the republic of letters, who does not respect this right.

But where are the professions of the Board to admit nothing of a sectarian character into their publications? Will they pretend that these volumes, with all the alterations Dr. Greenwood has sacrilegiously made, are not sectarian? Are they not crammed and overflowing with the peculiar doctrines and sentiments of the orthodox school? This is no objection to the book in our eyes, but it exhibits, in a striking manner, the reliance we may place on the declarations of the Board.

But the metaphysics which lie at the bottom of these volumes, and of those of Paley, are in our judgment false and mischievous; precisely the metaphysics which leave to religion no rational foundation, and to

faith in general no solid basis. We confess that we are by no means pleased to see these works placed in the hands of youth. The Board, we presume, were unconscious of the actual character of these works, and had no suspicion of the false metaphysics on which they are based. The individuals composing the Board are very worthy men, but we trust that we may without offence question their philosophical insight or attainments. They are men of facts, of detail, of routine, not men of ideas, philosophers, who read the human soul, and see all opinions in the light of the principles which generate them.

But we have said enough by way of censure. We wish to see Education promoted. We are willing to live and die in its sacred cause; but we agree with the present Chief Magistrate of this Commonwealth, that so far as our common schools are concerned, in order to promote it, "the responsibility of their management should rest upon the inhabitants of the towns." The State, either immediately, or mediately, through boards and committees, should interfere as little as possible. To the inhabitants of the towns, or rather of school districts, we would leave the management of the school and the selection of its library undictated to, and uninfluenced by the extra-official sanctions and recommendations of a Board of Education.

EDITOR.

ART. VII. — *Answer of the Whig Members of the Legislature of Massachusetts, constituting a Majority of both Branches, to the Address of His Excellency, Marcus Morton, delivered in the Convention of the two Houses, Jan. 22, 1840.* Boston: Perkins & Marvin. 1840.

THE election of a Democratic Governor of the ancient Commonwealth of Massachusetts has given our whig friends more trouble, and caused them more serious alarm for their future political existence, than any other event which has lately occurred. They have seemed to themselves to see in it the part of a man's hand, writing upon the walls of their palace, that they are weighed in the balance and found wanting, and that their dominion is taken from them, and given to another.

The Inaugural Address of this Democratic Governor has also caused them much alarm. It has been welcomed by the democracy of the Union, as a clear, able, and faithful exposition of democratic principles and measures, and is evidently making a deep impression on the citizens of this Commonwealth. It does not suit the whigs, because it advocates doctrines and measures which must be approved by the great body of the American people, as soon as they are seen and understood. In putting it forth, Governor Morton has given serious offence to the whigs. He has offended them by showing that he adheres firmly to democratic principles; perhaps still more, by showing that he *has* principles to adhere to.

In all communities there are those, who have a sort of prescriptive right to be offended whenever the truth is told, or just and equal legislation is advocated with earnestness and ability. We do not, therefore, blame our whig friends for taking offence at Governor Morton's Address; we are only sorry that they have not been able to maintain some dignity in their wrath, and some little respect for the ordinary decencies of



civilized life in their mode of manifesting it: That the Address, by marking out the democratic policy and recalling our citizens to the first principles of our government, is likely to do much mischief to the whig cause, we are not disposed to deny; but we regret that the adherents of that cause should, under any provocation, forget the respect they owe to themselves, to say nothing of the courtesy due to the chief magistrate of the commonwealth.

The "Answer" before us purports to be from the whig members of the legislature; but in point of fact, we apprehend many of the whig members, whose names are attached to it, knew little of its contents when they signed it, or gave permission to use their names, if, indeed, they gave the permission at all. It purports, also, to be from a majority of the members of both branches; but few among us can doubt, that, had it been reported to the legislature, and discussed there, according to the old method, it never could have obtained the vote of a majority of more than one branch of the legislature. This, and not a sudden fit of economy, is probably the reason why the old method has been departed from, and an unofficial, instead of an official answer to the Governor's Address, has been given.

The "Answer" itself is not precisely what we had a right to expect. The whigs claim to be the more enlightened and respectable part of our community. They claim for themselves all that is noble, manly, or refined. They look down upon democrats as base and vulgar, and deem us unworthy of admission into what they call good society. We have, then, a right to demand more of them than they have of us. Their public documents and electioneering pamphlets should be characterized by learning, talent, dignity, and good breeding. They should breathe an elevated moral tone, speak to the nobler instincts of our nature, and quicken our purer and more virtuous affections. They should take broad and generous views of man and society, and set forth their doctrines with that

clearness, and accompanied by that cogency of reasoning, which would secure instant conviction. Unhappily we find nothing of all this in the pamphlet before us. Its tone is low and scurrilous. It bears no marks of commanding intellect, of extensive acquaintance with political science, no trace of the statesman, or even of the moralist. There is betrayed in it not a single elevated thought, generous sentiment, or moral aspiration. It is from beginning to end disingenuous and sophistical; a striking proof of the utter heartlessness of the party putting it forth, or its singular contempt of the people, to whom it would commend itself.

Then, again, we should naturally expect, in an answer to a document like the Governor's Message, which clearly sets forth the first principles of democracy, as applicable to the Federal and State Governments, a counter statement of whig principles and measures. But here, again, we have been doomed to disappointment. We have sought long and wearily for a fair, full, and explicit account of whig doctrines and policy, but we regret to say that we have sought in vain. What are whig principles and measures? If the whig party have any well defined principles and measures, why are they so chary of letting them be known? Out with them, friends. Tell us plainly, what is your faith, what it is you propose, what it is you would have, if you could. Democracy puts forth her principles, and relies on those principles for success. Let whiggism put forth her principles, so the people may see and understand them. Are the whigs ashamed of their own principles; or have they no confidence in them? Do they think they shall be more likely to succeed by concealing their principles and aims? If they are our superiors, let them prove it by their frank statement and manly defence of their principles, if in fact principles they have.

The Answer begins by finding fault with Governor Morton for announcing himself as the "Supreme Executive Magistrate." This, in this Commonwealth, is

the constitutional title of the Governor, and for this reason was used by Mr. Morton. The offence consists in using the words of the constitution. He would, we suppose, have been more acceptable to the whigs, had he used an unconstitutional title. Shall we infer from this, that what is unconstitutional is the most acceptable to the whigs?

Governor Morton says, in his Address, that he does not impute his election to any *personal* preference the people may have had for himself. "Their purpose was higher and holier." That is, says the Answer, "higher and holier than the purpose of his opponents." Is this a fair specimen of whig logic? Governor Morton evidently means to say that the people, in electing him, had a higher and holier purpose in view, than the mere elevation of an individual. The comparison is not instituted between the purpose of his friends and that of their opponents, but between the purpose to elevate an individual, and the purpose to establish and develop a principle. So the fine flourish about "the delicate task for a Chief Magistrate to institute a comparison between the purposes of two portions of his fellow-citizens," must be set down as so much whig rhetoric lost.

The whig members complain of the Governor for saying the purpose of the people in electing him to the office, on which he was entering, was "the better establishment and the more perfect development of a great principle of civil polity."

"A principle," he says, "founded in humanity, guided by benevolence, and looking to the ever progressive improvement and happiness of the whole human family, — the democratic principle, — which ever seeks to protect the weak, to elevate the depressed, and to secure the just and equal rights of all; a principle, which is in harmony with pure religion, that establishes the love of God as the first law of morality; a principle, which, by listening to the voice of reason as it breathes through the people, bows reverently before the dictates of justice, while it spurns at the despotism of man; a principle, which gives the highest security to property, by giving security also to labor, in the enjoyment of the fruits of its own in-

dustry ; a principle, which is free from envy and narrow jealousy, and cheerfully acknowledges the benefits of cultivated intelligence and of experience, while it respects, as the paramount fountain of freedom and order, the collective will that includes all the intelligence of the community, — the will of the people.”

“ If your Excellency,” say they, “ mean by this any other democracy than that of the constitution, particularly that new democracy which evaporates in professions of regard for the people, while it is undermining, for selfish purposes, the foundations of the great compact, which alone protects popular rights from anarchy, we shall not dispute with your Excellency’s party their exclusive claims to its honors and its profits. But if your Excellency means the true democracy of the constitution, it will probably be new information to the people of this Commonwealth, that the elevation of your Excellency by a bare majority of votes, aided by an unfortunate division among your opponents, manifests any new desire for its better establishment, and more perfect development.”

This passage is remarkable for its dignity, and its courtesy towards the Governor, as well as for its clearness and precision. It describes two kinds of democracy, one the democracy of the constitution, and the other a democracy, “ which evaporates in professions of regard for the people, while for selfish purposes it undermines ” the constitution, and paves the way for anarchy. Now this last kind of democracy is notoriously the especial democracy of the whigs. It is well known that for the last two years the whigs have, to some extent, claimed to be democrats ; and it is equally well known, because they themselves have acknowledged it, that they claim to be democrats only because they regard the people as so attached to the name, that they will not vote for a party which does not bear it. This is the sum and substance of a series of articles which appeared in the *Boston Atlas* immediately after the Maine election, in 1838. The *Atlas* is the leading whig paper in New England. It is conducted with more ability, has more life and freshness, and exerts greater influence, than any other whig paper we are acquainted with. It declared that the

whigs were beaten because they had suffered the other party to usurp the name of democrat; and it contended that they must now assume that name for themselves, and "descend into the forum to take the people by the hand." In other words, that they must profess to be democrats, and condescend to flatter and cajole the people. This policy the whigs have since pursued. That they might pursue it with greater chances of success, they have abandoned their old leaders, Messrs. Webster and Clay, men too clearly identified with anti-democratic principles and measures to be the leaders of a party anxious to pass for democratic, and have taken up General Harrison, a man of too little consideration in any respect, to determine in the least the character of the party which supports him. Far be it from us to say aught against General Harrison as a man; but we may say that in a political sense he has no character at all, and therefore may be made to assume any character his party wishes. This is, doubtless, the reason why he has been nominated to the presidency. Not a man in his party believes him in any respect as well qualified for the office as is Mr. Clay or Mr. Webster, but the party has believed he would run better than either of those gentlemen, probably because he carries less weight.

These considerations show very clearly that the democracy of the whigs is but the shadow of democracy. It is pretended to, not because they would adopt democratic principles and measures, but because they know that they have no chance with the people, unless they can make it believed that they are democratic. Nor is this all. The whigs are always professing great love for the dear people, talking about the laborer, and about poor widows and orphans, and that, too, when they are supporting measures which tend directly to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer. We must, therefore, concede to the whigs the exclusive honors and profits of "that new democracy, which evaporates in professions of regard for the people, while undermining the founda-



tions of the great compact, which alone protects popular rights from anarchy." They are too modest, no doubt, to claim this democracy as their own; yet as they have the exclusive right to it, there is no reason in the world why they should not have the honor and profit there may result from professing it.

The passage quoted from the Answer attributes Governor Morton's election to an "unfortunate division in the ranks of his opponents." This will do well enough for electioneering purposes; but in point of fact, the division alluded to hardly affected the vote for Governor at all. The whig members have reference, we presume, to the license question. Now it is well known that Liberals and Anti-liberals voted for both Mr. Everett, and Mr. Morton, and that the democratic party was hardly less divided on this question than was the whig party. Both parties were divided, and the probability is, that one party lost just about as much by the division as the other. Mr. Everett's vote fell short of his vote the previous year of only about one thousand, while Mr. Morton's gain was something over ten thousand. These facts have induced us to believe that Mr. Morton's election was the result of the actual democratic gain in the state; and if we wanted any further evidence of this, we should find it in the fact, that his gain was only in about the same ratio it had been for the last six or seven years.

The whig members sneer at the idea advanced by the Governor, that in electing him to the chief magistracy the people had manifested a desire for the better establishment and the more perfect development of the democratic principle. We are not surprised at this. The whigs are poor philosophers, and most miserable generalizers. They seem utterly incapable of conceiving that the people can possibly have a regard to principle, and support this or that man only because he is in their belief identified with a certain principle, or a certain measure. Men, as mere individuals, are nothing to the democracy. They see and

respect the great talents of Mr. Webster, and are proud of him as a man; but they give him not their suffrages, because they see that he is in no sense identified with democratic principles or measures. They respect the elegant scholarship and literary attainments of Mr. Everett; they will flock in crowds to hear him make a speech, and applaud him to his heart's content; but they will not give him their votes, for he has failed to identify himself with the popular cause.

The democratic principle is recognised very distinctly in the constitution of this commonwealth, and we believe it has been adhered to in our legislation, at least, as closely as it has in any of our sister states. With us, always excepting Vermont, our own, our native state, old Massachusetts holds the highest rank. We are jealous of her honor, and will not allow it to be called in question. The whigs could not have so long retained the supremacy here, had they not been somewhere within hailing distance of the democratic principle. Massachusetts whigs are by no means the worst specimens of their class, and are even more democratic, than the democrats, so called, were a short time since in some states, which we could name were we so disposed. Honor to whom honor is due. The legislation of our commonwealth has been bad enough, but it has been less anti-democratic upon the whole, than the average legislation throughout the Union. The great mass of the people of this state are thoroughly democratic, and be they called whigs or democrats, they will not often consent to a grossly anti-democratic measure. Still we believe that the democratic principle is very far from having attained to its full development; very far from having moulded all our institutions and our whole society in accordance with itself. There is need of its "better establishment and more perfect development;" and it strikes us, that the election to the chief magistracy of an individual, confessedly identified with it, is a strong proof that the people desire to

see it better established, and more perfectly developed.

The whig members charge the Governor with inconsistency in admitting that the regulation of the currency belongs to the Federal Government, while he does not rebuke the measures of the present Federal administration. We can hardly persuade ourselves that these whig members are so ignorant on this subject as they would have us believe. The democratic party have never denied, but always contended, that the regulation of the currency is the duty of the Federal Government; but this is something very different from the whig doctrine, that it is bound to furnish to commerce a sound and uniform *paper* currency, which shall be of equal value throughout the Union. In reviewing, some time since, one of Mr. Webster's speeches on the currency question,\* we said; "Mr. Webster insists upon the obligation of the Federal Government to provide for a uniform currency, safe, and of equal value throughout the Union. He reiterates this, and dwells upon it with as much earnestness as if he verily thought he was bringing out a novel and unadmitted theory. But really, in the constitutional sense of the term currency, nobody disputes him. It was unquestionably the intention of the framers of the constitution, that the Federal Government should provide for a currency which should be uniform and of equal value throughout all the states." On this point we assure the whig members that there is no difference of opinion among democrats. So far as currency can come under the control of government, it is by the constitution exclusively subject to the Federal Government.

But the only currency the Federal Government can constitutionally know, and consequently the only currency it can regulate, is a metallic currency. "Gold and silver currency," says Mr. Webster, "is the law of the land at home, and the law of

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\* See Boston Quarterly Review for July, 1838, p. 350.

the world abroad; there can in the present state of the world be no other currency." The regulation of this currency is given to Congress, and consists merely in coining money and determining its value. Thus far extends the constitutional power of the Federal Government, and no farther. Thus far and no farther do all true democrats wish the government to go. It has heretofore gone farther, and the effort of the past and present administrations has been to bring it back to this point. Entertaining this view of the subject, Governor Morton could not have been consistent with himself, had he not approved the measures of the General Government in relation to the currency.

But the whig members contend that the Federal Government should provide a safe and uniform paper currency, a thing it has no constitutional right to do, and could not do even if it had. A safe and uniform currency, other than a metallic currency, did never yet exist, and never can, unless the laws of nature be reversed. But this subject has already been so amply discussed in the pages of this journal, and is so well understood by the people, that we deem it unnecessary to enter further into its discussion.

The whig members, as a matter of course, condemn the Independent Treasury Bill, and in so doing manifest their usual ignorance of its precise character, and of political economy in general. But they may say as much as they please against the Bill, it will become a law in a few days, and we shall soon be able to judge of it by the test of experience. We must, however, contradict the following statement. Speaking of the Independent Treasury, the whig members say, "that the system will operate to reduce the rate of wages of the laboring classes, has been loudly insisted on by your Excellency's friends at Washington, as one of its signal advantages." We cannot persuade ourselves that this assertion was honestly made. The fact is, no such thing has ever been insisted on by the friends of the measure, and nobody at all acquainted

with the general principles of political economy can for one moment entertain such a notion. The Independent Treasury Bill will produce in itself but a slight effect on the business operations of the country one way or the other. It is chiefly valuable as rendering the fiscal operations of the government independent of banks and the business of banking, and as the first step towards a new and better system of legislation. In itself it will not prove a panacea for all the evils of a deranged currency. It will not restore broken banks, nor succor those that are ready to fail. It will not pay the debts of merchants, nor relieve the speculators in eastern or western lands. But it will prevent the government from becoming hereafter subsidiary to the ruinous speculations of individuals, and from being embarrassed by them. That the system of legislation, which begins with it, will have an important bearing upon industry, there can be no doubt; and that its effect will be to reduce the *nominal* price of labor and of property in general, is possible. But this implies no reduction in the value of either. The real rate of wages will not be diminished, but in fact increased, because a day's labor will procure more of the necessities of life than it can now. The prices, which have been maintained in this country for some time past, are unnatural, and are nominally far above what they are in reality. In consequence of these high prices, which really indicate nothing but the depreciation of our currency, foreigners have been able to compete with us in our own market, to the serious injury of our manufactures, and without any corresponding benefit to the laborer. A scale of prices nominally lower than the present, brought about by the establishment of a uniform and steady measure of value, maintaining a currency at par with the currency of the nations with which our commercial operations are carried on, would probably not only be the best of all protections to our manufactures, but also of the greatest benefit to the laborer.

The Governor takes occasion, in his Address, to



inculcate the doctrine, that "it should be our chief duty to make laws for the whole," thereby condemning the tendency to special legislation, which has at all times manifested itself in our legislature. The whigs think the Governor must be wrong, and special legislation a wholesome practice, because some instances of special legislation occurred during a former administration of Governor Morton and his friends. We are not aware that Governor Morton and his friends fifteen years ago were in favor of special legislation, though it would seem that they were not strong enough to resist the tendency to it; and if they were in favor of it then, we are happy to find by their opinions now, that they do not belong to that party which never profits by experience.

In regard to corporations, the views of the Governor are so sound, and so well expressed, that, although we are much pressed for room, we must quote what he says;

"Of the special acts above referred to, more than one half relate to corporations. One of the vices of the present age, stimulated by extravagance, and a thirst to acquire property without earning it, is a desire to transact ordinary business by means of charters of incorporation. These are supposed to possess advantages, and to confer facilities for the transaction of business and the acquisition of wealth. They are often used for purposes of speculation, and sometimes of deception and fraud. It may well be doubted, whether they bestow the benefits expected from them. But if they really do confer 'particular and exclusive privileges,' it constitutes the strongest objection to their enactment.

"Municipal, parochial, literary, benevolent, and charitable incorporations, are sometimes necessary and useful. But to corporations for the purpose of holding and managing property, there are many objections. They change the nature of property, converting real into personal. They injuriously affect the matrimonial relation, depriving the wife of her right of dower. They affect the modes of conveyance, avoiding the publicity of the county registry. They diminish the liability of the partners for the debts of the company. And they create a kind of mortmain, inconsistent with the spirit of our laws, and the genius of our government. The prohibition of entailments,

and the equal distribution of property, are essential to a democratic government. I wish they were incorporated into our Constitution. Reestablish entails and the right of primogeniture, and I should despair of the continuance of our government.

“Perpetuity is said to be one of the attributes of a corporate body. Its members are continually changing, but its legal entity and tendency remain the same; and, unless it be limited in its charter, or meet an unusual termination, it will live forever. Property thus holden in perpetual succession cannot come under the full operation of our statute of distributions. The stock may be distributed, and new stockholders introduced; but the corporation remains unchanged, continuing to hold the corporate property, and to pursue the end of its creation, unaffected by the mutation of its component parts.

“Corporations, as such, are not responsible for crimes. They can be reached only through their members and officers; a remedy not coextensive with the evil, and always resorted to with reluctance. Corporations have no moral responsibility. The responsibility for acts of the corporation is so divided among its members, and so covered with the corporate shield, as to lose most of its power. Acts of incorporation vest the control and management of masses of property, and of extensive business, on which many may depend for subsistence, in a few persons, who, without the restraint of self-interest or individual responsibility, use the means in their hands for the accomplishment of objects, from which, as private citizens, they would shrink. Special charters, therefore, should be granted only for public purposes, beyond the ability of individual efforts, and when the public exigencies require that private property should be taken for public uses. If facilities for combined action in ordinary business transactions be deemed necessary or useful, they should be created by a general law, like the law of limited partnerships, which should be alike accessible to all; and of which every joint stock company might avail itself, without requiring the agency of the legislature.”

To this the whig members reply, at considerable length, to the effect that they apprehend that his Excellency is mistaken. But the only argument they offer in favor of corporations is, that “they greatly increase the opportunities for men of moderate property to engage in enterprises beneficial to themselves

and the public, which otherwise could be prosecuted only by the very rich. "The man of small property," say they, "by means of a share in a bank, which any one can buy, comes into the market as a money-lender, in fair competition with the great capitalist, though he has himself but a small sum to lend; and by means of a share in a manufacturing company, equally accessible to all, he enters on equal terms with the richest man in the community, into the business of manufacturing, from which he would otherwise be wholly excluded, for the want of sufficient capital." These whig members must count much on our ignorance, if they suppose that we can be made to believe that banks are sought by those who have money to lend. The mere stockholder, as such, derives no great benefit from banks. Men who have money to lend can, in this country, find borrowers enough without recourse to banks. Banks are sought not by the money-lenders, but by the money-borrowers, and their actual operation is to substitute credit for money. They are a simple contrivance for selling credit, not for loaning money, and the great profit obtained by them is not on loans of money, but on sales of credit. Then, again, it is not easy to make us believe that a man, who owns a single share in a manufacturing company, engages in the business of manufacturing *on equal terms* with the richest man in the community. But be this as it may, the advantages here specified may be obtained under a general law of limited co-partnership, as well as under a special act of incorporation. Copartnerships for the transaction of business have been proved by experience to be of high utility; but why a special act of incorporation for manufacturing purposes is more necessary than for commercial purposes, we confess we are not able to see. Our merchants do not ask to be incorporated, and yet there are mercantile houses which employ as large a capital as is ordinarily invested by a manufacturing company.

Our limits compel us to pass over the remarks of the

whig members on that portion of the Governor's Address, which relates to the loaning of the credit of the state to rail-road and other corporations. For ourselves, we are strongly in favor of internal improvements, and we do not apprehend that as yet the state has loaned its credit to any project of internal improvement, which will not be of high utility to our citizens generally. We would gladly see our whole country intersected in all directions by rail-roads and canals. Whatever facilitates intercourse between one part of the country and another, facilitates the interchange of ideas, creates a community of interests, and promotes the cause of democracy. But we are opposed, in the first place, to having the work of internal improvement done by the Federal Government, because that government was instituted for other purposes, and has no constitutional right to undertake it; and because it would so increase its patronage, and so bring it home to the business operations of the country, as to enable it in the end to swallow up the State governments. We are, in the next place, opposed to having the work carried on conjointly by the State government and corporations. For in this case the government will be used for the especial benefit of the corporators. And especially are we opposed to the state's lending its credit to a corporation, because in this case it takes the whole risk without any claim to a share in the profits; and because no reason can be alleged, why the government should loan its credit to enable a company to build a rail-road, which may not be alleged, why it should loan me its credit to enable me to build a house or publish my Review. We would have the work done either by individuals or by the state. We prefer having it done by the state, but of course no faster and on a no larger scale than is warranted by its resources.

We have room to notice only one topic more. Governor Morton says, in his Address, "if the right of self-government, the right of suffrage, be a natural

one, belonging to every rational being, there can be no just cause for depriving any citizen of it, except, perhaps, as a punishment for crime." This sentence has given the whig members much uneasiness, and plainly indicates to them a settled design on the part of the Governor and his friends to overturn the constitution. "Here is," say they, "the doctrine plainly avowed of universal suffrage!" Certainly, gentlemen; and have you learned now for the first time, that democracy insists on universal suffrage? What! would you permit miserable vagrants, the vicious poor, who contribute nothing to the expenses of government, to vote? Ay, and idle coxcombs, broken down debauchees, the vicious rich, who corrupt the morals of the people, and devour their substance, also to vote. There may be danger from the exercise of the right of suffrage by the vicious poor, but far less than from its exercise by the vicious rich. The poor would make much better guardians of the rich, than the rich are of the poor, and if guardianship there must be, we go decidedly for that of the poor. We have heard much about the vicious poor, and the necessity of excluding them from the exercise of the right of suffrage; but we do not recollect of ever hearing it insisted on that the vicious rich should also be excluded; and yet one vicious rich man can do more mischief to society than a hundred poor men. Till our whig friends insist on the exclusion of the vicious rich, we shall believe it is not vice but poverty that they would exclude.

There seems to be no doubt entertained by our whig friends that men of property have a right, or should have the right, to vote. But why have they this right rather than the poor? The men of property, it is thought, may determine the conditions on which men of no property may exercise the right of suffrage; but why may not men of no property determine the conditions on which men who have property may vote? Why is the right to regulate this matter inherent in the one class, any more than it is in the



other? Is the right of suffrage an incident of property, or of Humanity? In other words, is government instituted for the protection of property, or of man? Here, gentlemen, is the question, and we pray you to meet it fairly. If you contend that the end of government is to protect property, then we concede to you that the right of suffrage is an incident of property; but if you admit that the end of civil government is the protection of man in the enjoyment of his rights, and that it protects property only because the right to property is one of the natural rights of man, then you must concede to us that the right of suffrage is incident to Humanity, and that Governor Morton is correct in representing it as "belonging to every rational being." Then, unless it can be shown that a man forfeits the character of a rational being by the fact, that he is poor, no one can justly be excluded from the exercise of the right of suffrage on account of his poverty.

"For the virtuous and unfortunate poor, we feel as much respect as your Excellency expresses." We are much obliged to you, gentlemen, and in return assure you, that we feel equal respect for the virtuous and unfortunate rich. But why this condescension? Speak to the poor as men, as your equals, if you respect them, not as children. The poor demand not your compassion, but your justice. Be just to them, and you may reserve your compassion for yourselves. In political matters we recognise no distinction between rich and poor. We know only men; and all who can make good their claim to be called men, human beings, we regard as equals and fellow-citizens.

"We feel assured that the people of Massachusetts will not recognise this breaking down of all distinctions between the virtuous and the vicious, as one of the elements of the democratic principle." The criterion of virtue, then, is the payment of a poll-tax! Surely the whig members have most exalted ideas of morality, and a most ready way of determining wheth-

er a man is or is not moral. According to them the moral value of a man may be told in dollars and cents.

“We agree that all men enter the world with equal *rights*, though not with equal *powers*.” And for this very reason government becomes necessary. Men cease not to be equal in their rights, because unequal in their powers. The inequality of powers introduces injustice into society, and the oppression of the weak by the strong. Government is not needed to exaggerate this inequality, to add to the power of the already naturally powerful, but to protect the weak against the strong, and by the force of justice to compel all to respect the equal rights of each. This being the design of government, if any are excluded, it should be not the naturally weak, who need protection and whose rights are the rights which are endangered, but the naturally strong, against whom protection of the weak is necessary. The inference, then, which our whig friends would draw, that because the poor have not equal powers with the rich, they ought not to be permitted to exercise the right of suffrage, is by no means necessary or just.

“That the right of suffrage is a natural one, belonging to every rational being, seems to us,” say the whig members, “a singular proposition. In a state of nature no such right could be exercised. Election, representation, suffrage, are the creatures and contrivances of society. The natural right of a man is to be governed by himself alone; but this right is to be abandoned the moment he enters civilized society. It is a part of the contract by which he receives protection from the majority, that he shall yield to the majority this natural right of individual self-government; this is the very foundation of the social compact.”

We pray our readers to mark this passage. It is a clear and express avowal of the doctrine, which we have heretofore charged the whigs with maintaining, and which, we have been told, they did not maintain. The passage is replete with Hobbism; and we hope that when we assert the identity of Hobbism and

whiggism, we shall not again be accused of misrepresentation.

The whig members in this passage deny that the right of suffrage is a natural right, and assert that it is merely a conventional right, a "contrivance" of society. But who is society? Who constitute the society which contrives the right of suffrage? Is this society composed of all the rational beings of the community; and does each individual exercise a free and equal voice in adopting the contrivance? If so, the right of suffrage is admitted as belonging to every rational being, because each exercises it in determining by what contrivances society shall be managed. If this society be not composed of all the rational beings of the community, of whom, then, is it composed? Of a part, of course. If so, by what right does one part of the community assume to adopt rules and regulations for the government of the rest? Who gave to this part the right to declare itself the body politic, and to say on what terms new members may be admitted, who may be admitted members, and who may not? And why has not the portion of the population excluded as much right over this, as this has over that? We speak of rights, not of powers. We well know what are the historical facts in the case, and can readily tell why one class is excluded, and not another; but we ask by what right it is done? The reason why one class is excluded from the body politic is not, we apprehend, in any case, that it has no right to be admitted, but simply because it has wanted the power to make its rights respected; and this is the reason why they who are excluded are not the rich and powerful, but the poor and defenceless.

We are far from being prepared to concede that a man has the "natural right to be governed by himself alone." Man is born under law, and has never the right to be governed by anything but justice. But, conceding him this right, we must deny that he can abandon it. A natural right inheres in a man's nature, and belongs to him by virtue of the fact, that he

is a man; and so long as he remains a man, it must cleave to him, and he cannot abandon it even if he would. We cannot, then, consent to the doctrine, that man, on entering civilized society, yields up his natural rights. The constitution of this state declares that "all men are born free and equal, and have certain *natural*, essential, and inalienable rights;" and it also declares that "the end of the institution, maintenance, and administration of government is to secure the existence of the body politic; to protect it; and to furnish the individuals who compose it with the power of enjoying, in safety and tranquillity, their *natural rights*, and the blessings of life." Do the whig members intend to set aside the constitution? Why, then, do they teach a doctrine which contradicts its fundamental principles? And can they, while doing this, have the effrontery to pretend to be alarmed for the safety of the constitution? The rights of society are not made up of the rights individuals have surrendered. Its rights are original, and from God; and the ground they cover was never covered by those of the individual. Government is of divine appointment, and is instituted not by divesting individuals of their natural rights, but for the protection of the natural rights of individuals. Whatever the individual can show is his natural right, he may call upon government to maintain for him; and it is the natural right as it is the duty of government to do it. Men are in possession of certain privileges, enjoying certain monopolies; government has the right to dispossess them; because privileges, monopolies cannot exist, without encroaching on the natural rights of some portion of the community.

More we would add, but we have already exceeded our limits. We began by characterizing the Answer, as low and scurrilous. We end by saying that, if this pamphlet is the best answer the whigs of Massachusetts are able to make to the statement of democratic doctrines and measures, they have need to humble themselves in sackcloth and ashes; nay, to set their houses

in order, for the day of their departure is at hand. The day when such pamphlets as this could aid a political party has gone by. The people are weary of this eternal cant, and this eternal absence of living principle and manly thought. Whoso would prosper politically in this commonwealth, must plant himself on great and everlasting principles, and speak out to the people in the tones of moral dignity, and of unaffected love of Truth and of Humanity.

EDITOR.

## LITERARY NOTICES.

*Charles Elwood ; or, The Infidel Converted.* By O. A. BROWNSON. Boston : Charles C. Little & James Brown. 1840. 16mo. pp. 262. — We have too much modesty to praise, and too much self-respect to condemn, one of our own productions ; so we shall pass no judgment on the merits of this little volume. It is an attempt to present, in a readable form, and in a moderate compass, the grounds of religious faith. Most of the great problems connected with our faith, as Christians, are taken up, and a method of solving them suggested. The author professes to give it to the world as a sort of *compte rendu* of his former unbelief and present belief. To those who are somewhat troubled with doubts, and asking for more certain grounds of religious faith, the book, it is hoped, will not be unwelcome. We venture to offer the following extract, on miracles.

“ ‘ Do you use the miracles as proofs of the revelation ? ’ ”

“ ‘ No. Because the evidence I have of the truth of the revelation, is stronger than that which I have of the fact that the miracles actually took place. The miracles rest on historical testimony, the weakest kind of testimony ; the truth of the revelation rests on the testimony of a witness I have within. I do not use them as proofs, because I have as much ability to detect the presence of God in a moral doctrine as I have in the display of physical power. If I know nothing of God, I cannot detect him in the extraordinary display of physical power ; if I know enough of him to detect him in the miracle, I must needs know enough of him to detect him in the doctrine, and therefore I do not need the miracle.’ ”

“ ‘ What then is the use of miracles ? ’ ”

“ ‘ I do not know what was the actual purpose for which they were wrought ; nor do I know what purpose they actually served. I can conceive, however, of a purpose they might have answered, and there is a use I can make of them now. As to the purpose they might have served : Mankind, especially when but partially enlightened, are much



more attracted by extraordinary displays of physical power, than by the exhibition of moral grandeur. Had Jesus, for instance, appeared in the simple dress of a Jewish peasant from the obscure village of Nazareth, out of which it was proverbially said no good thing could come, whatever had been the purity of his life, the truth and excellence of his doctrines, he would hardly have secured a single listener. The miracles he performed, therefore, were necessary to draw attention to him, and induce people to listen to him. To the simple peasant-teacher nobody would have paid any attention. But from the man who could cast out devils, open the eyes of the blind, unstop the ears of the deaf, enable the lame to walk, and cause the dumb to sing, who could still the raging tempest, and compel the grave to yield up the dead to life, they could not so easily turn away. Here was something extraordinary; here was a wonderful man, what had he got to say?

“Again, you cannot have failed to observe how prone men are to regard nature as possessed of causative power. Nature moves on so harmoniously, with so much regularity and uniformity, that we are exceedingly liable to regard all her phenomena as the effects of her own independent causality; thus stopping at second causes, and virtually banishing God from the universe. Now it seems necessary that this order, this uniformity, should at times be broken through, so that we may see that an omnipotent Will rules in the affairs of the world; that there is a God who holds nature in his hand, and does with it as he pleases. Miracles, which are interruptions of the natural course of events occurring at distant intervals; seem to me admirably calculated to produce this effect, to raise men’s minds from second causes to the First Cause, and to show them that nature is but what He wills.

“There is another use of miracles, or rather of the events termed miracles, which I can make. I may regard them as so many symbols, each covering a great truth, or an important moral lesson. This use of them is, perhaps, the principal one to be made of them now, and it is affected by no theory we may adopt as to their having actually occurred. Take as an illustration of what I mean, the miracle of the Resurrection. I of course admit the miracle in its literal sense. But suppose I could not make it out that the body of Jesus actually rose, yet the great lesson taught us by the story of the resurrection remains unimpaired. Jesus was engaged in a great work, that of the complete and final redemption of man from every species of thralldom. In this work he encountered opposition, he was taken and crucified, buried in a new tomb, closed up and guarded with armed soldiery; but on the third day he rose from the dead, and after a few days ascended in triumph to God. So runs the narrative.

“Now for the moral. The defenders of the truth may be poor and few in number, they may be despised, persecuted, and put to death. Their cause may seem crushed to the earth, and destroyed forever. But it is not dead. It shall rise again. It shall burst the cerements of the grave, strike to the earth the armed bands of its enemies, and rise on high and shine forth in Divine glory and majesty. And is it not so? The earth has been strown with the dead bodies of the defenders of Liberty, and yet not one drop of blood has been spilt in vain. The cause has always risen from the grave, and been always marching onwards to victory. An obscure individual utters a great idea; the kings of the earth conspire against him, his feeble band of followers are dispersed, but the idea is immortal, is unconquerable, and rises from the

dust of the battle-field, where it was supposed to be left with the slain, prepared for new battles and ultimate victory. Here is a truth precious to all the friends of Humanity. It breathes the breath of life into the reformer, enables him to stand up undaunted against a world. What though I am alone, and of the people there is none with me? what though ye scoff and sneer at me? what though ye rage and vent your spite at me? Rage on, do your worst. Ye may silence my tongue, palsy my arm, crush my body, and seal me up in a new tomb hewn from the rock. What then? Ye cannot touch the holy cause in which I am engaged. I speak for God, for man, and my words shall echo through eternity; before the truths I utter ye shall yet grow pale and tremble; nay, bow down and worship. Here is the moral of the resurrection. Cherish it, all ye who love your race, and know that in the sacredness of your cause ye are immortal and invincible." — pp. 237 – 241.

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*Oration, delivered before the Biennial Convention of the Alpha Delta Phi Society, at New Haven, Conn., August 15, 1839, on the Law and Means of Social Advancement.* By SAMUEL EELLS, President of the Convention. Cincinnati: Kendall & Henry. 1839. 8vo. pp. 69. — We thank Mr. Eells for his very interesting and eloquent oration. It is on a great subject, one deeply interesting to every lover of his race, and on which the American people should think more deeply, and hope altogether more than they have heretofore done. Mr. Eells seems to cherish the warmest love for free principles, and to indulge the most generous hopes as to the destiny of man and of society. The first part of his oration, which treats of the law of social advancement, or which more properly adduces the evidences of the progress of the race towards a future golden age, we have read with unmingled delight, and heartily acquiesce in the conclusion to which he arrives, that

"Philanthropy does not delude herself with a beautiful but baseless vision, in anticipating the era of human regeneration. She sees in man himself a capacity for boundless improvement, and that both the desire and expectation of it are native to the human heart. She sees that his whole past history, taken on a complete scale, exhibits not a retrograde but a progressive movement. She discerns, moreover, in individual events, even those of the most baleful aspect, the marks of a moral providence; the tokens of a beneficent design, which appears to be the law of the whole scheme, and in obedience to which He, who 'seeth the end from the beginning,' administers the moral government of the world. She sees how the most violent concussions have terminated in purifying the moral atmosphere, and arousing Humanity from a fatal torpor; how those revolutions, which threatened the extinction of liberty and civilization, have carried them forward with a fresh progress; how cruel and unjust wars have been made the means of diffusing learning, commerce, and the arts; how states and empires, which have perished by corruption or the sword, have all accomplished their destiny, and given place to new and better forms of social order."

The second part of the oration, which treats of the MEANS of carrying society forward to its perfection, is not equal to the first part, and would almost seem to be by a different hand. The means of

social progress, the author says, "do not lie within the compass of any of those sentiments which prevail almost universally, respecting the improvement of society: no means are adequate to raise man to his highest dignity and felicity, but moral influences acting on his interior condition: on the inward spiritual character. We hold that all real and permanent improvement must begin inwardly, and work outwardly; that the fountain of all social progress lies in the *moral* nature of man; and that every civilization, which has not its support here, must decay and come to an end."

The doctrine here advanced, would seem to be, Perfect your individuals if you would perfect society; but this is very much like recommending the cure of a sick man as the means of obtaining a remedy for his sickness. The progress of society, or the melioration of the social order, is never to be sought as an end. That social order which permits the perfection of individuals is already perfect, and needs no improvement. Society is subservient to man, not man to society. A given social order is bad, because it exerts an influence unfavorable to the perfection of individuals, and for no other reason.

Mr. Eells falls into the error of trying to construct the universe by the aid of a single principle. He would carry man forward by a single power. Now in every proposition he should learn two terms are necessary, and with but a single factor he can never obtain a result. Through all outward nature there are two powers, contraction and expansion; and through the whole moral world there also run two forces, an active force, and a passive force; and without the conjunction of the two, nothing is generated. The ancients recognised this fact, and shadowed it forth by contending for gods of both sexes. Man is both active and passive; he acts, and is acted upon. In the fact of regeneration, the spirit of God acts on him, and his own spirit also acts from its own energy. The soul is regenerated neither wholly by its own action, nor by the Divine agency; but by the conjunction of the two. This fact is variously represented by the terms, liberty and necessity, fate and free-will, human ability and divine grace, or the strength of the will and the force of circumstances.

Now, in all our systems we must recognise these two forces. Society acts on man, that is, man is influenced, and his character to a certain extent is determined, by the social order under which he lives; and again, man acts on the social order, and by his spiritual force modifies it, and adapts it to his wants. The internal character of man is modified by the external influences which act upon him; and these external influences are modified by his internal character. All is not fate, nor yet is all freedom. This may not be satisfactory to those who are everywhere seeking systematic unity; but it is the fact as borne witness to by all experience. We hold, therefore, that one of the means of perfecting individuals is the melioration of man's external condition; that is, the progress of society.

"The glory of a state," says Mr. Eells, "consists not in its monuments, but in its men."



"Not high-raised battlement or labored mound,  
Thick wall or moated gate,  
Not cities proud, with spires and turrets crowned,  
Not bays and broad-armed ports,  
Where laughing at the storm rich navies ride,  
Nor starred and spangled courts,  
Where low-bred baseness wafts perfume to pride ;  
No ! *Men, high-minded men*, — these constitute the state."

Grant it. But the problem is, how to produce high-minded men ? Literature, art, science, forms of government, and forms of faith and worship, are subsidiary to this end, and are, therefore, means of individual and social advancement. Why, then, exclude them from the list of means by which society is advanced ?

But we have not, perhaps, seized the real thought of the orator. We suppose his real thought is, that the advancement of society is to be effected solely by the cultivation of man's moral nature, as contradistinguished from his intellectual nature. He would call forth the moral sentiments, and rely altogether on them. But he would do well to remember that a *knowledge* of the truth is not less essential than a *zeal* for the truth. A man may have just moral feelings, and a love for God and man proof against all trial, and yet be one of the worst of men to be entrusted with the concerns of the public. His ideas and opinions may be altogether wrong ; and acting in obedience to these, he will be mischievous in proportion to the conscientiousness with which he acts. "I am no partisan," says one, "I go for the best men." For the men who best understand the interests of society, and are pledged to what you conceive to be political truth, and right public measures ? "O no ; but for men whom I believe to be the purest in their feelings, and the most conscientious in their conduct." Nonsense. Give us purity and conscientiousness, to be sure ; but give us also right views and sound opinions.

We dislike the disposition, which has been manifested since phrenology came among us, to disjoin the head and the heart, or as the transcendentalists, we suppose, would say, the reason and the soul. Man's whole nature has its place, and for society a heart without a head is, to say the least, no better than a head without a heart. The affections are cultivated, refined, and exalted through the influence of truth, by the action of ideas. The reason is the light of the soul, and the soul's warmth comes from the same source. Man and society go onward to their lofty destiny, not by means of any single power, but by the combined action of all outward and all inward influences. Let us, therefore, quarrel with none of these influences, but accept their aid, and labor according to our several gifts, either in reforming the material order, or in reforming the spiritual order.

Ed.

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*Calidore ; A Legendary Poem.* By WILLIAM J. PARODIE. Boston : Marsh, Capen, Lyon, and Webb. 1839. 8vo. pp. 48. — We notice this poem more for the sake of the author, than for itself. As a poem, we cannot award it the highest praise ; and yet we are

much deceived if any one can read it without feeling, that none but a true poet could have produced it. The versification is sweet and musical; and though there is nothing original in the design, the language, or the thought, there is yet a certain something about it that produces a poetical effect. We do not think it does justice to the author, who, we are confident, is capable of producing poetry of a high order. The Song of the Naiads, with which the poem concludes, is truly beautiful.

Ed.

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*Pebblebrook, and the Harding Family.* Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1839. 12mo. pp. 207.—This work will not receive the credit it deserves, because the author has unfortunately fallen into a servile imitation of the style and manner of a distinguished English writer of the day. Yet it is really worth reading, and it bears the marks of thought, high moral feelings, a deep reverence for truth, and mental independence. The author is bigger than his book, and will yet, we trust, give us a bigger book. Let him rely on himself, and write in his own manner, and he has nothing to fear. As it is, we have read his book with much pleasure.

Ed.

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*Lectures on the Elevation of the Laboring Portion of the Community.* By WILLIAM E. CHANNING. Boston: William D. Ticknor. 1840. 12mo. pp. 84.—The subject of these Lectures is too important, and they come from too distinguished a source, to permit us to despatch this pamphlet in a mere literary notice. We merely announce its publication, and shall take the earliest opportunity to enter at length into the subject it so ably and eloquently discusses.

Ed.

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*An Address to the Literary Societies of Dartmouth College. On the Character and Influence of German Literature. Delivered at Hanover, N. H., July 24, 1839.* By A. H. EVERETT. Boston: 1839. 8vo. pp. 60.—We ought to have noticed this Address before, but we have had so many other things pressing upon us, that we could not very well do it. It is, however, a production that will keep and possess an interest beyond the day of its publication. We have no space to review it now, nor to enter into its subject. We can merely say that those who wish, in a brief compass, to obtain a general conception of German Literature, and especially of the literary character of Schiller and Goethe, will find this Address worthy of their attentive perusal. It is the production of an accomplished scholar, and of an enlightened and liberal-minded man, who takes a deep interest in whatever concerns the welfare of his country or the progress of his race.

Ed.

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*The Captivity in Babylon, and other Poems.* By the Rev. JOSEPH H. CLINCH, A. M. Boston: James Burns. 1840. 12mo. pp. 115.—



From the title page, as here quoted, we learn that the author is a Reverend, and a Master of Arts, two pieces of information which he seems to have thought it important to communicate to the world. The book is handsomely printed, much to the publisher's credit; and the poems *look readable*, but as we have not read them we dare not hazard a conjecture as to their merits. The public would not have us speak of that whereof we are ignorant.

ED.

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*The Good House-Keeper, or The Way to Live Well, and to be Well while we Live. Containing Directions for Choosing and Preparing Food, in regard to Health, Economy, and Taste.* By MRS. S. J. HALE. Second Edition. Boston: Weeks, Jordan & Co. 1839. 12mo. pp. 144. — Mrs. Hale's name as author is a sufficient guaranty, that this will be found to be a good book, and we therefore commend it to all who are, or would be, or would have good house-keepers.

ED.

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*Traditions of Palestine.* By HARRIET MARTINEAU. Boston: William Crosby & Co. 1839. — We are glad to see this book reprinted with its original title, and as it came from the hands of the author. To our taste, it is decidedly the best thing Miss Martineau ever wrote. We always delight to think of her as the author of the *Traditions of Palestine*.

ED.

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*The Analyst; A Collection of Miscellaneous Papers.* New-York: Benjamin G. Trevett. 12mo. pp. 174.

*Woman's Mission.* Boston: William Crosby & Co. 1840. 16mo. pp. 156.

*White Slavery; A New Emancipation Cause, presented to the People of the United States.* By the Author of "The District School As it Was." Worcester: M. D. Phillips. Boston: C. C. Little & Co., and B. B. Mussey. 1839. 16mo. pp. 199.

1. *Life of Christopher Columbus.* Boston: B. H. Greene. 1840. 16mo. pp. 233. 2. *The Lives of Hernando Cortes and Francisco Pizarro.* Boston: B. H. Greene. 1840. 16mo. pp. 194.

*Voices of the Night.* By H. W. LONGFELLOW. Cambridge: John Owen. 1839. 16mo. pp. 159.

*An Historical Discourse, delivered at the Celebration of the Second Centennial Anniversary of the First Baptist Church in Providence, Nov. 7, 1839.* By WILLIAM HAGUE, Pastor of the Church. Providence: Cranston & Co. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln. 1839. 12mo. pp. 192.

*The Last Days of the Savior, or History of the Lord's Passion. From the German of Olshausen. Mors Christi, Vita Mundi.* Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1839. 16mo. pp. 248.